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Summary 
 
Over the last decades, a substantial amount of empirical evidence has deemed the unitary 
model of family behaviour inadequate. A range of alternative models have been developed, 
but there is no general agreement as to which one is the most suitable. Empirical evidence 
may even suggest that the appropriate model differs between different parts of the world.  
A key feature of non-unitary models is that they are open to the possibility that intra-
household income distribution may affect household demand if the husband and the wife have 
different preferences. In my thesis, I present alternatives from three broad classes of models, 
all of which have in common that both individual preferences and the decision process matter. 
One alternative is the non-cooperative model (Ermisch 2003; Ulph 2006) in which it is 
assumed that family members are economically detached from one another and behave 
strategically according to their own private agendas. Another alternative is the collective 
model (Chiappori 1988) which postulates that family members will cooperate, but that the 
gains from cooperation might be unevenly distributed depending on each family member’s 
personal bargaining power. Bargaining models (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and 
Horney 1981; Browning and Lechene 2001) take it one step further by specifying a 
bargaining process directly, usually assuming Nash-bargaining. The unitary model, the non-
cooperative model, the collective model and the bargaining model are fundamentally different 
and in many aspects mutually exclusive. 
Using data from the US Consumer Expenditure Survey 2010, I select a sample of 812 
quarterly observations of couples with children where both spouses are in full time 
employment. Based on the individual income records provided in the survey, I estimate how 
much of family income is formally controlled by the wife. I then use the expenditure data to 
examine whether the wife’s share of household income has a systematic impact on household 
spending on several categories of goods. The categories are children’s clothing, household 
operations, household equipment and health insurance – goods that can reasonably be 
classified as public to the spouses. I then estimate the impact of the wife’s share of household 
income on household spending within the context of a variety of model variants that impose 
different restrictions on the response patterns. Finally, I conduct a series of statistical tests to 
see if one type of model fits the data better than other models do. My findings indicate that 
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the traditional unitary model of family behaviour has poor explanatory power, and that the 
collective model (Chiappori 1988) is a suitable candidate for its replacement. In this context, 
that means that the distribution of income between the spouses has a significant impact on 
how the household spends its resources. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Seeing then that the state is made up of households, before speaking of the state we 
must speak of the management of the household. 
Aristotle in Politics Book I Part III 
 
The role of the family has changed substantially through the centuries. In ancient times, 
finding a partner and raising children could be a question of survival. Today, it is usually a 
matter of personal preference – at least in modern Western cultures. But although the 
traditional nuclear family may now be just one of several options an individual can choose, 
for many it is still the principal institution for affinity between partners, co-residence, child-
rearing and organizing everyday life. Therefore, the family also plays a central role in public 
debate. You would be hard pressed to find a Western politician who does not claim to 
promote the best policies towards families and children. As in many running debates, there is 
a battle between ideologies, beliefs and claims to the truth – which often turns out to be quite 
elusive.  
Economic concepts such as scarcity, trade-offs and conflicting interests are essential 
ingredients in family interactions. Thus, economists may provide valuable knowledge for 
decision makers about important aspects of family life. Indeed, many government policies 
aimed at families are economic policies that alter the choices and incentives family members 
face. Without understanding how families react to changes in the economic environment, 
these policies become random experiments that may or may not work as intended. Economists 
might not have all the answers as to what are the best family policies, but there are strong 
reasons to believe that decisions based on empirical observations are preferable to those based 
on hopeful guesswork.  
A central topic in the current academic debate among family economists is how to accurately 
model family behaviour. There exists a variety of models that are fundamentally different, 
both in assumptions and predictions. There is, however, no general agreement regarding 
which type of model is the most appropriate given the context. This presents a serious 
challenge to family economists, because when plausible assumptions and conclusions collide, 
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answering key questions can become difficult. A possible path to resolving some of the 
dispute is to conduct empirical tests where alternative models of family behaviour are pitted 
against each other. This is what this thesis is about.  
A focal point for the empirical analysis in this thesis is household demand for intra-household 
public goods, and how this is affected by intra-household income distribution. This is one of 
the areas in which different models predict radically different outcomes. It is also an area 
suitable for empirical testing, because it requires data that to a certain extent is readily 
available, namely income data and expenditure data. As in many fields of research, the data is 
never as complete and as accurate as researchers would like, but it is nevertheless of such 
quality that empirical analysis seems possible and fruitful.  
Investigating which models of family behaviour are plausible, and which that are not, is 
important for several reasons. First, finding the appropriate model is interesting by its own 
right in the sense that it satisfies an intellectual curiosity. Second, finding the appropriate 
model can help us provide better answers about the family and their responses to policies and 
changing times. Most importantly, perhaps, how household demand responds to changes in 
intra-household income distribution is of interest to anyone concerned with distributive 
justice. If economic factors affect bargaining power within marriage, then skewed 
opportunities in the labour market may be amplified in the family. This is highly relevant in 
regards to fairness and gender equality. Also, if intra-household allocation of goods is 
sensitive to outside influences such as divorce laws or women’s wages, so is quite possibly 
the welfare of children. But if some outcomes are deemed unsatisfactory, what can policy 
makers do about it? That question would be hard to answer without understanding the family 
decision process. 
There is considerable agreement among economists that the traditional unitary model of 
family behaviour, a model that doesn’t specify a decision process at all, is inadequate and in 
need of replacement. In this thesis, I present alternatives from three broad classes of models, 
all of which have in common that both individual preferences and the decision process matter. 
One alternative (section 3.3.2) is the non-cooperative model (Ermisch 2003; Ulph 2006) in 
which it is assumed that family members are economically detached from one another and 
behave strategically according to their own private agendas. Another alternative (section 
3.3.4) is the collective model (Chiappori 1988) which postulates that family members will 
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cooperate, but that the gains from cooperation might be unevenly distributed depending on 
each family member’s personal bargaining power. Bargaining models (Manser and Brown 
1980; McElroy and Horney 1981; Browning and Lechene 2001) (section 3.3.5) take it one 
step further by specifying a bargaining process directly, usually assuming Nash-bargaining. 
The unitary model, the non-cooperative model, the collective model and the bargaining model 
are fundamentally different and in many aspects mutually exclusive. 
The search for the appropriate economic model of family decision making may yield different 
answers across cultures and contexts. It is a task that will most likely go on for many years to 
come, and I do not seek to provide any final answers. The goal of this thesis is merely to 
provide a relevant piece for a rather large puzzle.  
Using data from the US Consumer Expenditure Survey 2010, I select a sample of 812 
quarterly observations of couples with children where both spouses are in full time 
employment. Based on the individual income records provided in the survey, I estimate how 
much of family income is formally controlled by the wife. I then use the expenditure data to 
examine whether the wife’s share of household income has a systematic impact on household 
spending on several categories of goods. The categories are children’s clothing, household 
operations, household equipment and health insurance – goods that can reasonably be 
classified as public to the spouses. I then estimate the impact of the wife’s share of household 
income on household spending within the context of a variety of model variants that impose 
different restrictions on the response patterns. Finally, I conduct a series of statistical tests to 
see if one type of model fits the data better than other models do. My findings indicate that 
the traditional unitary model of family behaviour has poor explanatory power, and that the 
collective model (Chiappori 1988) is a suitable candidate for its replacement. In this context, 
that means that the distribution of income between the spouses has a significant impact on 
how the household spends its resources. 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides a historical account of some 
of the ideas that have shaped the field of family economics. Chapter 3 contains the theoretical 
backdrop, in particular a presentation of three classes of models that serve as viable 
alternatives to the standard unitary model. These alternative models form the basis for the 
empirical tests. Chapter 4 describes the data used for these tests, and also some of the 
challenges facing empirical research of this kind. Chapter 5 presents the main findings and 
some possible interpretations of the results, before chapter 6 concludes. Detailed regression 
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results and the composition of the public goods chosen as dependent variables can be found in 
the appendix. 
5 
 
2 Background 
2.1 Before the 20th century 
The branch of the social sciences that we today know as economics has always recognized 
“the family” or “the household” as an important economic institution. After all, the origin of 
the word “economics” is “oikonomikos” – the title of the Greek historian and philosopher 
Xenophon’s treatise on managing an agricultural estate (Backhouse 2002 p. 14).1 In the 18th 
century, economists such as Richard Cantillon, Adam Smith and Robert Malthus investigated 
the link between economic circumstances and human reproductive activities, and how this 
affected population size (Browning et al 2011 p. 4; Sandmo 2011 p. 64). During the 
methodological debate following the development of theoretical economics and the principle 
of self-interest in the 19th century, economists on both sides used family behaviour to support 
their own views. John Stuart Mill, widely credited as the father of the utility maximizing 
homo economicus, used as an example how Swiss families shifted resources between home 
manufacturing and agriculture depending on the season and the weather conditions (Mill 1909 
Bk. III Ch. XXV).2 The Irish economist Tomas E. C. Leslie, on the other hand, dismissed the 
emphasis on rational self-interest in economics when he wrote that “among the chief motives 
to production, the most powerful of all to accumulation, and deeply affecting consumption 
and distribution, are conjugal and parental affection” (Leslie 1884 p. 196).3 But although 
many economists before the second half of the 20th century stressed the importance of the 
family as an economic institution, few attempts were made at actually modelling family 
behaviour. The family remained a “black box” until the 20th century.  
2.2 The impact of Gary Becker 
What really stands out as seminal contributions to the field of family economics are the works 
of Gary Becker (1930- ). Using the tools of neoclassical microeconomics, he moved into 
fields not commonly associated with economics such as discrimination, crime, drug addiction 
and family behaviour. This way of expanding the scope of economics into areas usually 
                                                            
1
 The Greek word «oikos» literally means «household» (see Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary). 
2
 The first version of this book was published in 1848. 
3
 The original essay titled “Political Economy and Sociology” was first published in Fortnightly Review January 
1st 1879   
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occupied by other social sciences, sometimes referred to as “economic imperialism”, has at 
times been subject to extensive ridicule (Sandmo 2011 p. 445; Backhouse 2002 p. 311).4 
Indeed, Becker himself did not escape mockery, but that does not seem to have limited his 
efforts.5 Becker’s Treatise on the Family, first published in 1981, is one of the most important 
works in modern family economics (Ermisch 2008). Topics include “marriage markets”, 
intra-household resource allocation and welfare, investment in children and inter-generational 
transfers. Becker’s importance lies not necessarily in how many people agree with his ideas, 
but in how many of his successors that define their position relative to him. Or as Robert 
Pollak, a long standing critic of Becker puts it: “His ideas have dominated research in the 
economics of the family, shaping the tools we use, the questions we ask, and the answers we 
give” (Pollak 2003 p. 40). Pollak elaborates on this by conceding that even though his own 
work could be seen as criticizing Becker, it could also be seen as reshaping Becker’s tools 
(ibid) – which in a sense is following Becker. As a further testament to Becker’s importance, 
he was awarded The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred 
Nobel in 1992.   
To family economics, Becker introduced familiar economic concepts such as exogenous 
preferences, rational behaviour and utility maximization. One of his best known propositions 
is the “Rotten Kid Theorem” which says that a selfish child will behave selflessly towards the 
family (i.e. maximize family income) if the family is headed by an altruistic parent who is 
making transfers to the other family members (Becker 1999 p. 288).6 In Becker’s theoretical 
universe, altruism serves as an effective disciplining device. He suggested that the Rotten Kid 
Theorem can explain why a parent delays some contributions to their children to later stages 
in life, or even after the parent’s death, so as to provide a long run incentive for the children to 
consider the interests of the family as a whole (ibid p. 293). Another property of the “effective 
altruist”-approach is that as long as the altruist remains effective, intra-household distribution 
of goods is invariant to intra-family income distribution. This is in line with the unitary model 
and the income pooling hypothesis, a model which takes the family as a single decision 
making unit in the market. Although complete income pooling has been largely rejected in the 
                                                            
4
 For an amusing example read The economics of brushing teeth (Blinder 1974). 
5
 “I remember giving a paper on economics and population at a conference in 1957 and people laughing at 
me.” (Becker in interview with Richard Thompson, published in The Independent online October 18
th
 1992) 
6
 A corollary of the theorem is that a beneficiary who is envious of other beneficiaries will maximize family 
income and thereby help those envied. 
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empirical literature, Becker’s arguments have given name to a particular kind of “local” 
income pooling known as “Becker-regions”. This will be formally presented in section 3.3.3.  
2.3 Further developments 
Becker’s ideas have been criticized along many lines, among which are obscuring power 
relations within the family (Grapard 1999 p. 550), ignoring the possibility of endogenous 
preferences (Pollak 2002 p. 10) and being “fatally simplistic” (Bergmann 1996 p. 9). Many 
economists found the ‘family consensus’ and the ‘effective altruism’ approaches inadequate, 
and in the 1980’s several efforts were made at modelling family behaviour with multiple 
decision makers having (partly) conflicting interests. Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy 
and Horney (1981) were among the first to apply cooperative game theory to marriage 
(Lundberg and Pollak 2008). At the core of this approach lies the idea that each spouse can 
revert to a non-cooperative outcome if the result of cooperation is unsatisfactory. This non-
cooperative utility level is referred to as a “threat point” and may stem from an outside option 
typically taken to be divorce (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981) or an 
inside option i.e. non-cooperation within marriage (Lundberg and Pollak 1993; Bergstrom 
1996). The threat points, which may depend on a range of factors, affect bargaining power 
within marriage and hence the final outcome.7 An important implication of these models is 
that if the distribution of income affects the threat points, it also affects the outcome and 
hence well-being for the husband and wife respectively. This stands in stark contrast to the 
income pooling hypothesis. 
Another type of models is the “collective” approach first introduced by Chiappori (1988). The 
defining property of these models is that outcomes are assumed to be Pareto efficient. Instead 
of modelling a specific bargaining process, Chiappori shows that given a set of assumptions, 
the collective model is equivalent to the existence of a sharing rule. First, family income is 
allocated between public goods and each spouse’s private spending. Second, the spouses 
maximize their own private utility given their respective budget constraints. The size of each 
spouse’s share depends on a range of distributive factors that reflect bargaining power in the 
family. The efficiency assumption imposes testable restrictions on behaviour, among which 
are symmetrical responses in household demand to changes in distribution factors that affect 
the sharing rule (Ermisch 2003 p. 27).  
                                                            
7
 Nash-bargaining is the most commonly used bargaining process in these models (Lundberg and Pollak 2008) 
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Other types of models include pure non-cooperative models (Ulph 2006) and intertemporal 
models (Bergstrom 1996; Lundberg and Pollak 2003). These typically allow outcomes to 
become inefficient through non-cooperative behaviour in the provision of public goods and/or 
past decisions leading to an inefficient outcome in later periods. Due to the fact that I am 
using cross-sectional data, a discussion of intertemporal models is not part of this thesis.8  
                                                            
8
 The data set is not strictly cross-sectional, because the observations in the sample are from five different 
quarters. For reasons explained in chapter 4, the time dimension in the data is ignored.  
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3 Theory and models 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework that motivates the empirical analysis. Before 
introducing the actual models, however, I think it is useful to discuss some fundamental 
properties relating to preferences – and the corresponding glossary (section 3.2). The reason is 
that the type of preferences chosen for a model setting has important implications for the 
predictions of the model. Some of these implications are similar across different types of 
models. Furthermore, since economists differ in the terms they use to explain the same 
concepts, I think it is fruitful to explain the vocabulary I will be using.  
The relevant models are presented in section 3.3. A key point of this exercise is to show how 
different models predict different expenditure patterns as functions of the wife’s share of 
income – properties that lend themselves well to empirical testing. For reference, I start with 
the standard unitary model before I move on to the non-unitary models. The first of these is 
the non-cooperative model with egotistic preferences (section 3.3.2) where I demonstrate how 
this leads to income pooling for some distributions of household income, but not all. In 
section 3.3.3, I show how going from egotistic preferences to a kind of “caring” preferences 
(see section 3.2.2) changes the predicted spending pattern for heavily skewed income 
distributions.  
A collective model is presented in section 3.3.4. A defining property of the collective model is 
that the outcome is assumed to be efficient, and the theoretical result here is used to 
demonstrate that the predicted outcome in the non-cooperative model is inefficient. A specific 
bargaining process, which the collective model lacks, is introduced in section 3.3.5. The 
model is a Nash-bargaining model where the non-cooperative outcome in section 3.3.2 forms 
the respective breakdown points. Along with the models I also show how family members’ 
basic preference structure has implications for the predicted outcomes.  
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3.2 Preferences (and some semantics) 
Microeconomic theory often assumes that preferences are stable and exogenous. This has 
been challenged in various contexts (Bowles 1998), among which is family behaviour (Pollak 
2002). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a full discussion of this, apart from 
noting that it seems reasonable to treat preferences as exogenous in the non-intertemporal 
framework I will be using. 
Another (sometimes implicit) assumption often present in microeconomic theory is that 
preferences are egotistic, i.e. that only an individual’s private consumption is present in the 
individual’s utility-function. This might be a reasonable assumption in a market context, but 
not necessarily so in a family context. It is common to assume that at least some family 
members care about the welfare of other family members, and this interdependency of 
preferences is formulated in various ways in the literature. Regardless of model and/or 
objective function, interdependency of preferences usually has important implications for the 
theoretical outcome.  
On the general level, exogenous preferences in the family context can be divided into three 
broad categories. Unfortunately, there is no common agreement among authors about which 
terms should be used to refer to which category. This subsection is included to explain the 
vocabulary I will be using – and to alleviate any potential confusion. 
3.2.1 Egotistic preferences 
This is the standard specification used in countless expositions in economics. For two people, 
a husband and a wife, this could be formulated as:  
( )
( )
,
,
h h
h
w w
w
U v
U v
=
=
x G
x G
 
Here, xi are vectors of private goods and G is a vector of public goods. Preferences for both 
individuals are defined over private consumption only, and no other individual’s consumption 
enters the respective utility functions (insofar as external effects that could be included in the 
G-vector). A corollary of this is that an individual’s total utility and private utility (the v-
function) effectively become the same. Some authors use the term “egoistic” instead of 
“egotistic”, but I prefer the latter so as to distinguish the term from psychological egoism. I 
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see the term “egotistic” as a matter of semantic convenience rather than a theory of human 
nature as such. 
3.2.2 Deferential preferences 
Deferential preferences refer to a type of interdependent preferences that can be described in 
the following way: The individual cares about at least one other person’s utility but not how it 
is actually obtained. Following the husband and wife example from before, the general 
specification is:  
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
, , ,
, , ,
h h h w
h w
w w w h
w h
U v v
U v v
ψ
ψ
=
=
x G x G
x G x G
 
Each spouse has a private utility function defined over private consumption, but also an 
aggregator function that resemble a Bergson-Samuelson welfare function (Varian 2006 p. 
620). One crucial point to be made about this specification is that it involves no preferences 
about the composition of other people’s consumption bundles. In the family context, this 
might seem somewhat counterintuitive (Ermisch 2003 p.47). For instance, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that a wife cares about how her husband dresses, or that she is not 
indifferent to whether he gets his utility from smoking or jogging. The reason why this kind 
of preferences is popular among family economists is that they impose testable restrictions on 
the outcomes of family decision making (Ermisch 2003 p. 27).  
The familiar reader might recognize this preference structure as “caring” (Browning et al 
2001 p. 19) or “altruistic” (Becker 1991 p. 278). My use of the term “deferential” follows 
Pollak (2002) who argues that “altruistic” conflicts with ordinary usage of the term and causes 
confusion with non-economists. For instance, if a wife thinks her husband should spend more 
time at the gym and less time in front of the television because she thinks it’s good for him, it 
would probably coincide with most people’s conception of “caring”. In this context, however, 
that would violate the specification at hand. The term “deferential” refers to the fact that the 
husband defers to the wife’s preferences regarding her consumption and vice versa. In 
Pollak’s view, and I follow his argument, this is a more precise terminology.  
  
12 
 
3.2.3 Non-deferential preferences 
Non-deferential preferences exhibit the highest degree of interdependency between spouses: 
( )
( )
, ,
, ,
h h
h w
w w
w h
U v
U v
=
=
x x G
x x G
 
Here, the husband and the wife have preferences about the specifics of the spouse’s 
consumption. Ermisch (2003 p. 31) refer to these as “altruistic” preferences, but they could 
just as well be seen as “paternalistic” depending on the motivations of the individual. This is 
why I think Pollak (2002) makes a valid point when he argues that “non-deferential” is a more 
precise term. Non-deferential preferences are perhaps the most intuitively appealing 
preference structure when it comes to families, both when it comes to spouses caring for each 
other and parents caring for their children. But for modelling purposes, they lack some of the 
advantages of deferential preferences (Browning et al 2011 p. 104). One reason is that with 
non-deferential preferences, all goods effectively become public goods and researchers can 
impose fewer testable restrictions on the models. For example, a setup with deferential 
preferences allows for testing whether a good is a household public good or not, whereas a 
setup with non-deferential preferences does not. 
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3.3 Taxonomy of models 
Economic models of family behaviour can broadly be divided into unitary and non-unitary 
models. Unitary models treat the family as if it were a single decision making agent, whereas 
non-unitary models do not. What sets the latter apart from the former is the emphasis that is 
put on the intra-family decision process. In the unitary model, the decision process is simply 
assumed away (see section 3.3.1), and the family is modelled as if there exists a single 
“family utility function” and a pooled “family resource constraint”. Analogous to “the firm” 
in standard microeconomic theory, “the family” is treated as a single decision making agent 
and what goes on inside the family is hidden in the “black box”.  
In contrast, non-unitary models treat the decision process itself as important for the final 
outcome. In this process, individuals typically use their respective endowments according to 
their own agenda which may be more or less “altruistic” (see section 3.2 about preferences). 
Non-unitary models can again be broadly divided into cooperative and non-cooperative 
models. Both allow for interests to be conflicting, but there is a key difference when it comes 
to efficiency. In cooperative models there is generally the assumption that the outcome is 
Pareto efficient, and the conflicts of interests translate into deciding which of the possible 
efficient outcomes are realized. In non-cooperative models there is no such assumption, and 
the outcome is often Pareto-inefficient, particularly with respect to the provision of public 
goods. 
3.3.1 The Unitary Model 
The unitary model of family behaviour can be traced back to (at least) Paul A. Samuelson’s 
paper Social Indifference Curves from 1956. As the title suggests, the paper was not solely 
about family economics, but his discussion of “group demand” led to a discussion of how 
“family demand” is formed (Samuelson 1956 p. 8). Samuelson dismissed the idea that stable 
family preferences could stem from one family member having sovereign power within the 
family, noting that any casual anthropologist would find this at odds with modern Western 
culture. He did, however, find it less unrealistic to adopt a hypothesis of a stable and 
consistent family consensus that in turn would lead to a demand system that did not violate 
standard regularity conditions – although he somewhat jokingly added: “Perhaps Arrow might 
prove such a consensus to be impossible” (ibid p. 9). Becker, on the other hand, argues that an 
14 
 
“effective altruist” who is making intra-family transfers can give rise to a “family utility 
function” (Becker 1991 p. 296). This person is (by other authors) sometimes referred to as a 
“Becker-dictator”, even though Becker emphasizes that the altruist does not have dictatorial 
powers over the other family members’ decisions (ibid).  
Standard economic textbooks typically abstain from elaborating on the rationale behind the 
unitary model, they simply adopt it. A typical example of this can be found in Cowell (2005) 
who in the chapter about the consumer and the market writes that “Obviously, too, we could 
translate all this from the case where the consumer is an individual to that where the consumer 
is a household.” (Cowell 2005 p. 100). A simple form of the model with only a husband and a 
wife, no public goods and no saving, can be written as:  
 ( )max  ,    subject to   h w h h w w h wU c c p c p c Y Y Y+ = + ≡   
Here, the superscripts h and w represent husband and wife respectively. Y is income, c is 
consumption and p is the price of that consumption. Solving the maximization problem would 
yield demand functions of the form:  
 ( ), ,              ,i h wc D p p Y i h w= =  
A central feature of this approach is the income pooling hypothesis which is the idea that only 
total family income matters and that the source of income is irrelevant. Formally, since 
dYh=dYw, we have:  
,
i i
h w h w
U U c c
Y Y Y Y
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 
This means that the marginal family utility of income is independent of the sources of income, 
and so is the marginal demand for each of the two spouses. The unitary model can be 
extended in a number of ways to include for instance labour supply and intra-family public 
goods. Individual utility functions can be included in the family utility function as long as 
their respective weights are constant. As an example, the following model is considered 
unitary: 
15 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
max  W= , + 1 U ,                      0 1
s.t.   
h h w w
n
h w
i i i
i
U
p R c
µ µ µ
=
− ≤ ≤
+ + = −∑
c G c G
p c c G
 
Now, the c’s represent private consumption vectors and G a vector of intra-family public 
goods. The price vector p captures all relevant prices. The right hand side of the budget 
constraint is the value of all household resources, such as time that can be “sold” in the 
market, minus the resources used for consumption (such as time spent as leisure). The key 
assumption of income pooling still remains, and how the weight µ came about is irrelevant. 
On the other hand, if we allow µ to be endogenous and a function of for instance relative 
income, the model is no longer unitary.  
3.3.2 A non-cooperative model with egotistical preferences 
In this model, each spouse controls his or her own exogenous source of income, and from the 
outset there is therefore no income pooling. Cooperation between the spouses is absent in the 
sense that the husband and the wife each distribute their income between private spending and 
voluntary contributions to a public good, taking the spouse’s contribution as given. In other 
words, they behave according to the definition of a Nash equilibrium (Nash 1951). 
Intuitively, this model setup might seem a bit odd – at least in Western societies (Browning 
and Lechene 2001 p. 10).9 If two people voluntarily agree to form a household, would it not 
be reasonable to expect some form of cooperation to take place? As pointed out by Ermisch 
(2003 p. 21), modelling non-cooperative behaviour is not the same as postulating that this is 
how families actually behave. And despite the apparent non-realism inherent in models of this 
kind, they do have some theoretical appeal. First, they could be interpreted as the fallback 
position for family members if communication and/or cooperation were to break down.10 
After all, the sheer number of marriage counsellors and divorce lawyers suggests that simply 
forming a household does not a happy cooperative make. Second, the non-cooperative models 
serve as a point of departure from which the gains from cooperating can be illustrated and 
estimated. 
                                                            
9
 See section 3.5 for empirical evidence from Africa in favour of non-cooperative models. 
10
 See section 3.3.5 for an example of a bargaining model that uses the non-cooperative outcome as the basis 
for the breakdown points. 
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The following example will to a large extent follow Ermisch (2003) and is simplified for ease 
of exposition. This does not affect the general properties of the model (Browning and 
Lechene 2001; Ulph 1996). Assume a two person household consisting of a husband and a 
wife. For simplicity, assume only two goods; one pure private good, x, and one pure public 
good, G. Let preferences be of the egotistic type with log-linear utility:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2, ln 1 ln ,i i i i iU x G x G G g g i h wα α= + − = + =  (3.1) 
The α-parameter represents the weight each spouse puts on the private good relative to the 
public good. Now assume that the couple does not cooperate, and instead maximizes his/her 
welfare taking the other spouse’s contribution to the public good as given. Each spouse 
solves:   
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ln 1 ln
. . , ,
i
i i j i i i i j
x i g i i i j
Max U x g g x g g
s t p x p g y and g g G i j h w i j
α α+ = + − +
+ = + = = ≠
  (3.2) 
The maximization problem will yield the following demand functions for the public good:  
 
( )
( )
1
1
h h
h h w
g
w w
w w h
g
y
g g
p
y
g g
p
α
α
α
α
−
= −
−
= −
 (3.3) 
The demand functions resemble standard Cobb-Douglas demand functions with fixed budget 
shares for each good with the addition that the spouse’s contribution enters the demand 
function. For expositional ease, we can use the private good as the numeraire and then divide 
the public good into appropriately sized units so that the relative price can be normalized to 
unity. Then (3.3) can be rewritten as: 
 
( )
( )
1
1
h h h h w
w w w w h
g y g
g y g
α α
α α
= − −
= − −
 (3.4) 
For the husband, his contribution to the public good is increasing in his income, decreasing in 
the weight he puts on the private good and his wife’s contribution to the public good – and 
similarly for the wife. The demand functions in (3.4) are essentially “reaction functions” that 
describe the utility-maximizing level of contribution to the public good for any level of the 
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( )1 w wyα−
( )1 h h
h
yα
α
−
N
hg ( )1 h hyα− ( )1 w w
w
yα
α
−
spouse’s contribution. If both contribute to the public good, the equilibrium solutions will be 
where these reaction functions intersect. From the husband’s reaction function, we see that:  
• If the husband does not contribute, the wife will supply ( )1 w wyα− . 
• In order to make the husband not contribute, the wife must supply ( )1 h h
h
yα
α
−
. 
So if ( )1 w wyα−  < ( )1 h h
h
yα
α
−
, the husband will contribute to the public good. A similar 
argument can be made for the wife’s contribution, and the equilibrium solution can be 
illustrated graphically as in Figure 1:  
Figure 1: Equilibrium between non-cooperative reaction functions 
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Figure 1 illustrates the couple’s individual reactions functions in (3.4). The reaction functions 
are decreasing functions of the other household member’s contribution to the public good. 
The point of intersection determines each spouse’s contribution, and the equilibrium solution 
is: 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 1
1
1 1
1
h h h w wN
h
h w
w w w h hN
w
h w
y y
g
y y
g
α α α
α α
α α α
α α
− − −
=
−
− − −
=
−
 (3.5) 
Total contribution to the public good is simply gh + gw, and is equal to:   
 
( ) ( )( )
( )
1 1
1
h w h wN
h w
y y
G
α α
α α
− − +
=
−
 (3.6) 
This is the non-cooperative level of the public good when both spouses contribute. As is 
evident from (3.6), only total income matters and any (small) redistribution of income will not 
change the outcome. This is often referred to as “local income pooling”. But will they both 
contribute? From the husband’s equilibrium condition in (3.4) we see that he will not 
contribute if: 
 
( )1
1
h wh
h w h w
y
y y
α α
α α
−
≤
+ −
 (3.7) 
So if the husband’s income relative to that of his wife is “too low” he will not contribute to 
the public good. This is because his marginal rate of substitution between the public good and 
the private good is lower than the relative price of the public good. This happens if his income 
is “small” or if he puts a sufficiently higher weight on the private good relative to what his 
wife does. If this is the case, the solution is simply ( )1N w w wG g yα= = − . 
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Figure 2: Non-equilibrium between non-cooperative reaction functions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates a situation where the husband is “too poor” to contribute to the public 
good. When the strict inequality in (3.7) holds, redistributing income from the wife to the 
husband will reduce her spending on the public good and increase his spending on the private 
good. That means that (local) income pooling no longer holds. Conversely, the wife will not 
contribute when: 
 
( )1
1
wh
h w h w
y
y y
α
α α
−
≥
+ −
 (3.8) 
So for (local) income pooling to hold, the spouses’ relative income cannot be too different, 
and neither can their preferences be.  
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Figure 3: Non-cooperative household demand for the public good as function of the wife’s share of income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An important property of this non-cooperative model is that household demand for the public 
good is effectively a function of relative income. This is illustrated in Figure 3, where the 
wife’s share of (constant) household income is the independent variable. The leftmost point of 
the graph illustrates household demand when the husband controls all income. As income is 
transferred to the wife (moving to the right) the husband reduces his spending on the public 
good and the wife increases her spending on the private good. This process goes on until the 
wife’s marginal utility from spending on the public good is equal to her marginal utility from 
spending on the private good. In the figure, this corresponds to the first kink point in the 
graph from the left. In the following flat section, the result from (3.6) holds and there is local 
income pooling. This means that as income is transferred to the wife, she increases her 
contribution to the public good and the husband reduces his. Their actions exactly offset each 
other so that household demand for the public good is unchanged until the husband’s share of 
income becomes so low that he stops contributing to the public good. The flat segment in the 
middle of the graph is often referred to as a “Warr-region”. This is a reference to the result in 
Warr (1983) that states that if a group of individuals are all voluntarily contributing to a 
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public good, small redistributions of income will not change the allocation of neither public 
nor private goods. 
In Figure 3 I have assumed that the wife puts a relatively higher weight on the public good 
than what the husband does. This means that when she controls all income, household 
demand for the public good will be higher than when the husband controls all income. The 
assumption is merely illustrative here, but will become more important for models that will be 
discussed later.   
In the above example, the outcome is inefficient except for in the extreme cases where either 
the husband or the wife receives all income. The inefficiency comes from the fact that higher 
contributions to the public good could make both spouses better off, and is the standard 
inefficiency result from private provision of public goods. 
3.3.3 Introducing the Becker-region: A non-cooperative model with 
deferential preferences 
The non-cooperative model I will present here is the same model as the previous with one 
important exception, namely that the wife now has deferential preferences.11 As will be 
shown, this opens the possibility of the wife making voluntary transfers to her husband. This 
in turn leads to properties which can be transferred to other models as well.  
As before, assume a two-person household where income is spent on either a private or a 
public good. The husband has egotistic preferences and the wife has deferential preferences as 
described in section 3.2:  
 
( )
( ) ( )( )
,
, , ,
h h
h
w w w h
w h
U v x G
U v x G v x Gψ
=
=
 (3.9) 
This preference structure means that the wife cares about her husband’s utility, but not about 
the composition of her husband’s consumption bundle. Deferential preferences of this kind 
imply that according to the wife’s own evaluation of her utility, income could be better spent 
on her husband rather than herself.  
                                                            
11
 If it were the husband who had deferential preferences, the analysis would be symmetrical. I will also show 
cases where both husband and wife have deferential preferences. 
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For expositional convenience12, assume the same logarithmic utility as before and that the 
wife has a Ψ-function that simply puts a weight β on the husband’s utility: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
ln 1 ln( )
ln 1 ln 1 ln( )
h
h h h h w
w
w w w h h h h w
U x g g
U x x g g
α α
α α β α α
= + − +
= + − + + − +  
 (3.10) 
Since there is still no cooperation, both maximize their utility taking the partner’s contribution 
to the public good as given. As before, both prices are set to unity. Since there is the 
possibility of a transfer (t), the husband’s budget constraint is h h hx g y t+ = +
 
and the wife’s 
budget constraint is w w wx g y t+ = − . Since only the wife has deferential preferences, we must 
have 0t ≥ . Maximization yields the following reaction functions:  
 
( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1
1 1 1 1
h h h h w
w h w
w w h
h h
g y t g
g y t g
α α
α β α α
β α β α
= − + −
 
− + −
= − −  + − + − 
 (3.11) 
Nothing here says anything about what the transfer, if any, will be. Solving for equilibrium of 
the two functions, we get:  
 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )
( )
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1
1 1
h h h h w h wNt
h
h h w
w h w w h hNt
w
h h w
y t y t
g
y t y t
g
α β α α α β α
β α α α
α β α α α
β α α α
− + − + − − + − −
=
+ − −
− + − − − − +
=
+ − −
 (3.12) 
And for household demand for the public good:  
 
( ) ( )( )( )
( )
1 1 1
1 1
h w h h wNt Nc Nt
h w
h h w
y y t t
g g G
α α β α
β α α α
− − + − + + −
+ = =
+ − −
 (3.13) 
Obviously, the t’s cancel out, but are left in the equation for illustrative purposes. Once again 
the result is that as long as both are contributing to the public good, there is local income 
pooling (a Warr-region). When this happens, transfers don’t really matter but will 
nevertheless be zero (see appendix D).  So the question remains: When will there be transfers? 
When the husband is the only person contributing to the public good, there will by definition 
                                                            
12
 The following results do not rely on using log-utility functions. Browning and Lechene (2001) use more 
general utility functions to derive the Becker-regions. Using log-utility, however, enables the use of illustrative 
examples. See appendix D for an elaboration using the more general approach. 
23 
 
be no transfers since he has egotistical preferences. But if the wife is the only one 
contributing, she will transfer income to her husband if his income is sufficiently low.  
From (3.12), we know that the husband will not contribute to the public good when: 
 
( )( )
( )
1 1
1 1
h h wh
h w h h w
y
y y
α β α α
β α α α
+ − −
≤
+ + − −
 (3.14) 
This is a necessary but not sufficient condition in order to cause the wife to make transfers. 
Inserting the budget constraints and differentiating the second line in (3.9) with respect to 
transfers (see appendix D) will yield a first order condition that can be rearranged to:  
 ( ) 0w h h w wh x G w Gv v vψ ψ− − >  (3.15) 
This says that in order for transfers to be positive, she must value his utility gain from 
receiving money more than she values her own private utility loss from giving the money up. 
Transferring income to the husband means reduced spending on the public good from which 
they both will lose. But the husband will be better off, because he will spend the transfer on 
the private good and his marginal utility from the private good is higher than that from the 
public good (that is the reason he is not contributing to the public good in the first place). This 
means that the expression inside the parenthesis in (3.15) is positive. When her husband is 
better off, the wife is by definition better off because she has deferential preferences. But in 
order for transfers to be positive, this effect must more than offset her private utility loss from 
reduced spending on the public good. So how low must the husband’s share of household 
income be for this to happen? When he is not contributing to the public good, we have: 
( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
w hNc Nc
w w
h
h h
G g y t
x y
α β α
β α
− + −
= = −
+ −
=
 
Using (3.10), working through the differentiation in (3.15) and solving yields:   
 
1
h h
h w
y
y y
α β
β<+ +  (3.16) 
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To confirm that this is actually a smaller fraction than that in (3.14), note that:  
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
1 1 1 1 1
0
1 1 1 1 1 1
h h w h w hh
h h w h h w
α β α α α α β αα β
β α α α β β β α α α
+ − − − + −
− = >
+ − − + + + − −
 
When the husband’s relative income drops below the level in (3.16), the wife starts 
transferring money to him to keep his utility at what she perceives as the “minimum” level. 
So when the relative income of the husband is between zero and the level in (3.16) there is 
local income pooling and she behaves as an “effective altruist” towards her husband. 
Figure 4: Non-cooperative household demand for the public good when the wife has deferential 
preferences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 shows household demand for the public good as a function of the wife’s share of 
income. Compared to the non-cooperative model with egotistical preferences only, there is a 
flat region to the right in the diagram. This is the result of transfers from the wife to the 
husband. It is often referred to as a “Becker-region” in recognition of Gary Becker’s argument 
that an effective altruist gives rise to income pooling. If both the husband and the wife have 
deferential preferences, another Becker-region would be added to the left in the figure. Note 
that even though the Becker-region and the Warr-region has similar properties when it comes 
Becker-
region 
1
 
Wife’s share of income 
G
 
Husband stops 
contributing
 
Wife starts 
contributing 
Wife starts 
transferring
 
Warr-region 
25 
 
to outcomes, the rationales behind them are fundamentally different. The Warr-region is a 
result of strategic and “selfish” behaviour, whereas the Becker-region is a result of caring or 
“altruism”.  
3.3.4 The collective model 
If we now allow the couple to communicate and cooperate, the decision process changes 
significantly. In the context of the collective model, this means that it is assumed that the final 
outcome is efficient, i.e. it is not possible to make one spouse better off without making the 
other worse off. With egotistic preferences, this can be formalized as:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ),   subject to ,   and h wh w x h w g h wMax U x G U x G U p x x p G y y≥ + + = +  (3.17) 
With normally behaved utility-functions, the utility constraint holds with equality. The 
maximization problem leads to the following first order conditions:  
 
h w
x x
h w
gG G
h w
x x x
U U
pU U
U U p
µ=
+ =
 (3.18) 
µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the utility constraint and is the shadow value for 
the husband of reducing his wife’s utility, i.e. relaxing the first constraint in (3.17). The 
second line is the standard condition for the optimal provision of public goods, namely that 
the sum of the marginal rates of substitution should equal the relative price of this good. If we 
use the same log utility-functions as in (3.1), we can solve for the demand functions:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 11
1 1
1 1
h we
h w
g
h h w w h we e
h w
G y y
p
y y y y
x x
α µ α
µ µ
α α µ
µ µ
− − 
= + + 
+ + 
+ +
= =
+ +
 (3.19) 
A property of these demand functions is that the spouses behave as if they are each given a 
share of joint income, 1
1 µ+ and 1
µ
µ+  respectively, and then independently allocate their 
resources between the private and the public good. It is as if there is an income sharing rule 
stemming from the relative weight each spouse’s utility is given (Ermisch 2003 p. 27).  
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If we momentarily assume that the husband and the wife have the same preferences,
1 2α α α= ≡ , comparing (3.6) with (3.19) yields: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )( )
( )
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1
h we
N
h w
y y
G
y yG
α µ α
µ µ
α
α α
αα
− − 
+ + 
+ + 
= = + >
− − +
−
 (3.20) 
This confirms that the non-cooperative level of the public good is inefficient.  
 
Figure 5: Comparison of the collective model and the non-cooperative model 
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The curve in Figure 5 is called the “utility possibilities frontier”. It represents all possible 
efficient outcomes from (3.17) and is traced out by varying the Pareto weight. The non-
cooperative equilibrium from (3.6) is inserted as an illustration of an outcome that is 
inefficient – it is located “inside” the frontier. At the core of the collective model lies the 
prediction that the couple will end up somewhere on the utility possibilities frontier, i.e. that 
the outcome is efficient. What it does not say, however, is which point will actually be 
chosen. Although the basic collective model does not explicitly make any reference to a non-
cooperative solution, the latter could still be used in a thought experiment that would render 
certain elements of the locus more probable to contain the solution than do others. The 
husband is not likely going to accept a point to the left of point B, seeing as he then would 
gain from reverting to non-cooperation. Similarly, the wife will probably not accept a point to 
the right of point A. From (3.19) it is clear that in this particular setup, the outcome depends 
on the µ-parameter. If the µ-parameter is constant, the model collapses to a unitary model. 
But if µ depends on exogenous factors and/or is (partly) endogenous, the model is obviously 
not unitary.  
One possible interpretation of µ is that it reflects bargaining power in the family. In general, µ 
may depend on a range of factors, such as relative income, divorce laws, marriage market 
attributes and social customs. In the literature, these are often referred to as “distribution 
factors” (Browning and Chiappori 1998; Browning and Lechene 2001) or “extra-
environmental parameters” (McElroy 1990). From (3.19):  
 ( ) ( )2
1
1
e
h w
h w
g
G y y
p
α α
µ µ
−∂
= +
∂ +
 (3.21) 
If preferences are different, 1 2α α≠ , changes in bargaining power will affect spending on the 
public good. If preferences are the same, only private consumption will be affected by 
changes in µ. One factor of particular interest for empirical researchers is relative income, and 
it is common to assume that µ is increasing in this parameter. Denote ρ as the wife’s share of 
income, 2
1 2
y
y y+
, and θ as the share allocated to the wife, 
1
µ
µ+
 . Then from (3.19) :  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
Income effect Bargaining effect
1 11 1 1
e
h w h w h w
g g w
G y y
y p p y
θ ρθ α θ α α α
ρ
∂ ∂ ∂
= − − + − + − +  ∂ ∂ ∂
 
 (3.22) 
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The interpretation is that an increase in the wife’s income has two effects. First, it increases 
spending on the public good because total household income increases. Second, it increases 
the wife’s bargaining power, and thereby her allocated share of total income. This may add to 
or offset the income effect, depending on her preferences. If 1 2 0α α− > , she prefers the 
public good more than her husband does and the bargaining effect will have the same sign as 
the income effect. If the opposite is the case, then the total effect on G will be lower than the 
income effect alone.  
A central feature of a collective model like this one is that expenditure on the public good as a 
function of relative income is fundamentally different than that of the non-cooperative model, 
given that preferences are different and relative income is indeed a distribution factor:  
 
Figure 6: Household demand for the public good in the collective model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 6, I have kept the assumption made earlier that 1 2 0α α− >   which means that the 
wife has the strongest preference for the public good. As her relative income increases, so 
does family spending on the public good. With egotistic preferences, household demand is 
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strictly increasing in relative income (the solid line). If the wife has deferential preferences 
such as in (3.9), a Becker-region will appear in the right of the diagram (the dotted line). If the 
husband has deferential preferences as well, another Becker-region will appear in the left of 
the diagram (see Browning and Lechene 2001 p.7). Efficiency resulting in an income sharing 
rule also holds when deferential preferences are present (Ermisch 2003 p. 29). If preferences 
are non-deferential, however, the income sharing rule interpretation no longer holds. In that 
case all goods effectively become public goods, and the difference between “his” and “her” 
spending is blurred. 
3.3.5 Nash-bargaining models 
The standard collective model does not specify a detailed bargaining process other than 
saying that the Pareto weight depends on a range of distributive factors. If one specifies an 
explicit bargaining process, the model effectively becomes a bargaining model. A common 
variant is the Nash-bargaining model with a set of breakdown points known as “threat 
points”. In this model, the couple is thought to maximize the product of the gains from 
cooperation, taking the respective utilities from non-cooperation as their threat points: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,h h w wh h w wMax N U x G T Z U x G T Z   = − −     (3.23) 
The respective threat points depend on a range of factors included in the Z-vectors. Early 
formulations of this type of model used an outside option (divorce) as the threat points 
(Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney 1981). Other versions that have since been 
developed have taken the inside option as the threat point, that is non-cooperation within the 
marriage. An obvious difference is that a change in divorce laws or the marriage market may 
affect the outside threat point but usually not the inside threat point. Bergstrom (1996) argues 
that it is unlikely that a married couple resolve differences under the constant threat of 
divorce.13 Following his argument, and using the non-cooperative utilities from section 3.3.2 
as threat points, the solution can be represented by inserting an iso-product curve associated 
with the Nash function tangent to the utility possibility frontier:  
 
                                                            
13
 “If one spouse proposes a resolution to a household dispute and the other does not agree, the expected 
outcome is not divorce. A more likely outcome is harsh words and burnt toast, until the next offer is made.” 
(Bergstrom 1996 p. 1926) 
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Figure 7: The Nash-bargaining model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 7, the utility possibilities frontier is the same as in Figure 5. The threat points are T1 
and T2 respectively and stem from the non-cooperative solution. The outcome is at point NB* 
which is Pareto efficient. A positive shift in the wife’s threat point will shift the solution 
upwards and to the left as indicated by the dashed line and the dashed iso-product curve. A 
relevant question for this thesis is: In what way does going from the non-cooperative setting 
in 3.3.2 to a Nash-bargaining model with non-cooperative (inside) breakdown points change 
the demand for public goods as a function of relative income? The question can be answered 
with the help of a few intuitive arguments:14  
  
                                                            
14
 These arguments are based on Browning and Lechene (2001), but I have elaborated slightly to make them 
more specific and easier to follow. 
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1. In the Warr-region in the non-cooperative setting, the distribution of goods does not 
change as the distribution of income changes.  
2. Therefore, the threat points do not change in the Warr-region.  
3. That in turn means that the Nash solution does not change in the Warr-region since the 
Nash solution by definition is unique. 
4. Hence, the Warr-region is “inherited” by the cooperative Nash-model.  
Continuing the assumption that the wife has a relatively stronger preference for the public 
good than the husband does the following arguments will trace out the rest of the graph in 
Figure 8.  
5. As the wife’s share of total income decreases beyond the Warr-region in the non-
cooperative setting, her utility decreases and the husband’s increases.  
6. Therefore her threat point in the Nash-model is weakened and his is strengthened. 
7. Given that the wife has a stronger preference for the public good, the demand for 
public good is reduced as her bargaining power is reduced.  
8. Conversely, if the wife’s share of total income increases beyond the Warr-region, the 
demand for the public good increases.  
9. Any Becker-regions in the non-cooperative model are inherited by the Nash-model 
since local income pooling has the same non-effect on the threat points here as in the 
Warr-region.  
Figure 8 shows the link between the non-cooperative model and the Nash-model with respect 
to household demand for the public good as a function of the wife’s share of household 
income. The top panel is the non-cooperative model and the bottom panel is Nash-model. 
Starting from the left in the Nash-model, as her share of income increases (point A, the solid 
line), her threat point is strengthened so that she is able to push more spending on the public 
good according to her preferences. This happens because in the non-cooperative model, an 
increase in her share of income would have increased her utility from increased spending on 
the private good.  
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Figure 8: Household demand for the public good in the Nash-bargaining model with non-cooperative 
breakdown points. 
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If the husband would have made transfers when her income was “low” in the non-cooperative 
setting (the dashed line to the left in the top panel), her threat point would not change until she 
becomes “rich enough” for him to stop making transfers (where the dashed line ends at point 
B). In other words: Any Becker-regions are inherited by the Nash-model. As the wife’s share 
of income increases beyond point B, she is able to increase household demand for the public 
good until her share of income is so large that she would have voluntarily contributed to the 
public good had there been non-cooperation (point C). As her share of income increases 
further, nothing happens to household demand for the public good until the point at which the 
husband would have stopped contributing to the public good in a non-cooperative setting 
(point D). This is because as long as the distribution of income stays within the non-
cooperative Warr-region, the distribution of goods is unaffected by changes in relative income  
thereby leaving the threat points in the Nash model unchanged. Increasing the wife’s share of 
income beyond point D would increase her threat point, however, because she would have 
more to spend on the private and the public good whereas as the husband would have less and 
less to spend on the private good.  
3.4 Comparing the predictions of the various 
models 
The different models I have presented predict different consumption patterns with respect to 
the household public good and intra-household distribution of income (assuming that control 
over a portion of household income is indeed a relevant distribution factor). Letting demand 
functions be linear is of course a significant simplification, but should still provide testable 
implications. Assuming as before that the wife has a stronger relative preference for the 
public good, household demand under the different setups can be schematically summarized 
as in Figure 9 (kink points are arbitrary).  
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Figure 9: Comparing the predictions of the various models. 
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Figure 9 shows household demand as a function of the wife’s share of household income 
(total income is constant) for the models previously presented. The left column shows the 
models where both the husband and the wife have egotistic preferences, the right column 
where they both have deferential preferences. Each model variant, insofar as the unitary 
model, predicts a different combination of flat and sloped segments. There are also 
differences between the combinations of signs on the slopes. For instance does the Nash-
model have the same sign on both slopes while the non-cooperative model has opposite signs 
on the slopes. The actual signs depend on whether it is the husband or the wife that most 
strongly prefers the public good in question. Also note that although it is not explicitly 
included in Figure 9, there is the possibility that only one spouse has deferential preferences. 
This would mean that the model has only one Becker-region either to the left (husband 
deferential) or the right (wife deferential). A key point is that these patterns can be translated 
into testable restrictions which will be used for the empirical analysis.   
3.5 Existing empirical evidence 
The unitary model has been widely rejected in the empirical literature (Lundberg and Pollak 
2008, Browning et al 2011 p. 227). Using data from five Canadian Family Expenditure 
Surveys, Browning (1995) finds that the household saving rate decreases with the wife’s share 
of income (after accounting for many of the other influences on savings, such as age, 
household composition, education and occupation, but not household income). Phipps and 
Burton (1998) find that although income may be pooled for some categories of consumption 
(e.g. housing), the income pooling hypothesis is rejected for other categories. They also find 
effects in line with traditional gender roles, i.e. that expenditure on child care increases with 
women’s incomes but not with men’s. Another significant paper involves a “natural 
experiment” arising from a policy change in United Kingdom. Over the period 1977-1979, the 
Child Tax Allowance, which primarily went to the father, was replaced by a single Child 
Benefit paid directly to the mother. Lundberg et al. (1997) find a substantial increase in 
expenditures on women’s and children’s clothing relative to men’s clothing following the 
policy change, something that should not have happened under the unitary model.  
Results like these are not limited to countries with predominantly Western culture. Using 
expenditure data from Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Indonesia and South Africa, Quisumbing and 
Maluccio (1999) reject the unitary model for all countries, although to a varying degree. Their 
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results indicate that assets controlled by women have a positive and significant effect on 
expenditure allocations towards the next generation. Doss (2006) uses data from the 1991/92 
and the 1998/99 Ghana Living Standards Survey and finds that women’s share of farmland 
significantly increases budget shares on food. Schultz (1990) uses data from Thailand to reject 
the hypothesis that nonearned income of husband and wife has identical effects on family 
labour supply and commodity demands. Thomas (1990) uses Brazilian family data on health 
and nutrition and finds that unearned income in the hands of the mother has a bigger effect on 
family health than unearned income in the hands of the father. Notably, the effect on child 
survival probabilities is almost twenty times bigger.  
Although there is considerable evidence against the unitary model, there seems to be no 
general agreement as to which non-unitary model should serve as the alternative. Several 
attempts have been made at testing the assumption of efficiency inherent in the collective 
model. Bourguignon et al. (1993) and Browning and Chiappori (1998) are not able to reject 
efficiency when examining household expenditure data from France and Canada respectively. 
Udry (1996) on the other hand, finds evidence against efficient allocation of resources within 
agricultural households in Burkina Faso. He finds that plots controlled by women have 
significantly lower yields than similar plots within the household controlled by men. Udry 
attributes the yield difference to higher labour and fertilizer inputs per acre on plots controlled 
by men, and estimates that six per cent of output is lost due to the misallocation. Lemay-
Boucher and Dagnelie (2007) also reject efficiency when they use data from Benin to estimate 
a non-cooperative model of household behaviour. They conclude that spouses’ financial 
spheres are relatively disconnected.15 Doss and McPeak (2005) present several other findings 
of similar character in other African countries.  
What is lacking in the literature, however, are tests between the collective model and 
alternative non-unitary models for high income countries (Browning et al 2011 p. 229). One 
notable exception is Browning and Lechene (2001) who reject the unitary model for Canadian 
households and find results consistent with the collective model with (to some extent) 
deferential preferences. They also find no signs of Warr-regions, a finding which is 
inconsistent with respect to the non-cooperative model and the standard Nash-bargaining 
model with a non-cooperative inside breakdown point (as in 3.2.5). 
                                                            
15
 LeMay-Boucher and Dagnelie (2007) note that non-cooperative behaviour between spouses is in accordance 
with several anthropological accounts on West-Africa.  
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4 Empirical Strategy 
4.1 Data set 
4.1.1 The US Consumer Expenditure Survey 
To investigate the link between income distribution and household spending, I have chosen a 
data set from the US Consumer Expenditure Survey 2010. The survey is one of the most 
extensive of its kind and has been running in its current form since 1980. It is an ongoing 
survey where consumer units (CUs) are rotated on a quarterly basis; each quarter a portion of 
the CUs (roughly 1500) leave the survey and another set of CUs enter. Each CU can remain in 
the survey for up to five quarters.  
A consumer unit consists of any of the following: (1) All members of a particular 
household who are related by blood, marriage, adoption, or other legal arrangements; 
(2) a person living alone or sharing a household with others or living as a roomer in a 
private home or lodging house or in permanent living quarters in a hotel or motel, but 
who is financially independent; or (3) two or more persons living together who use 
their incomes to make joint expenditure decisions. Financial independence is 
determined by spending behavior with regard to the three major expense categories: 
Housing, food, and other living expenses. To be considered financially independent, 
the respondent must provide at least two of the three major expenditure categories, 
either entirely or in part. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2012) 
The main reason for choosing this particular survey is that it collects information from all 
categories relevant for this thesis, namely household characteristics, income distribution and 
budget allocation. Each year the Bureau of Labor Statistics makes microdata sets from 
recently published reports available for public use. The microdata sets for 2010 were made 
available on September 27th 2011 and contain data from the first quarter 2010 to the first 
quarter of 2011 – five quarters in total. 
The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) consists of two components: An interview survey 
and a diary survey, each with a separate questionnaire and sample. In the former, each CU is 
interviewed on a quarterly basis about expenditures respondents are expected to be able to 
recall over a period of three months and longer. In the latter, each CU is asked to keep a 
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detailed diary of expenses over a period of two weeks. This is specifically designed to obtain 
detailed information about expenditures on frequently purchased items such as groceries. 
Both components have their strengths and weaknesses as far as research purposes are 
concerned. The interview survey has the advantage that it covers a longer period of time so 
that is less sensitive to infrequency bias. It may however suffer from recall bias in the sense 
that although respondents are expected to recall their expenditures, they may not actually do 
so very accurately. As an example, of 445 observations of couples with at least one child 
under the age of two and where both spouses contributed to household income, roughly half 
of them recorded no spending on children’s clothing the last quarter. That may accurately 
reflect the sample’s spending habits, but it may also be a result of recall bias.  
The diary survey is less prone to recall bias but is much more sensitive to infrequency bias 
which means that a household’s expenditures over a period of two weeks may not accurately 
reflect household spending on infrequently purchased items over time. Since I am interested 
in items that are not necessarily bought on a weekly basis, the natural choice is the interview 
survey. 
4.1.2 Sample selection 
Seeing as children’s clothing is a typical example of a household public good, I take couples 
with children as a starting point. To mitigate endogeneity issues related to relative income and 
time decisions (see section 4.1.4), only couples where both spouses were registered as 
working full time were kept in the sample. To reduce the possibility of more than two main 
decision makers being present in the household, I decided to keep only households where the 
oldest child was fifteen years old or younger. This also lines up neatly with recorded spending 
categories on clothing where a cut-off is at fifteen years of age. In order to construct the 
relative income variable I kept only households where both spouses contribute to household 
income and where there are in fact non-zero individual income records for both spouses.16 In 
addition, I excluded households where at least one of the members has top-coded income 
because that would distort relative income calculations. 10 observations were removed due to 
very high budget shares for one or more goods. This left me with a sample of 812 quarterly 
                                                            
16
 Some households report that both spouses contribute to household income while one of the spouses reports 
no income in the individual records. This may happen because not all sources of household income are 
attributed to a household member.  
39 
 
observations spread out over five quarters. In the sample, the same CU may appear one, two, 
three or four quarters, but with individual expenditure records for each quarter. This 
obviously means that some households will be given more weight in the estimation process, 
but as long as the distribution of preferences does not vary systematically between the 
households that leave and households that enter the survey each quarter, that should not be a 
problem. I did briefly consider keeping only households for which I had four observations and 
then aggregate their spending records to construct yearly observations. The problem with this 
approach was that it would leave just above one hundred households – which I thought would 
be too few.  
4.1.3 Choice of goods 
In the CEX, each expenditure and income record is given a place within a system of Universal 
Classification Codes, informally known as UCCs. The UCCs are six digit codes that represent 
an item or groups of items. In the CEX 2010 a total of 751 UCCs are used. The BLS uses an 
aggregation scheme to construct broad expenditure and income categories, but users of the 
microdata sets are of course free to construct their own variables.  
What constitutes a household public good is to some degree a matter for discussion. Very few 
goods are strictly public in the sense that they are completely non-rival and non-excludable. A 
TV for instance is public in the sense that one person watching a program does not preclude 
others from watching it, but it is private in the sense that the person holding the remote 
control effectively excludes other programs that could be watched. For testing the different 
models, I chose the following goods to form the dependent variables:  
Children’s clothing – Clothes and footwear for children up to 15 years of age. This is 
a “classic” household public good in the literature. 
Household operations – This includes cleaning and gardening services, internet and 
computer services, babysitting and childcare. For a discussion of the inclusion of the 
services related to children, see the results chapter.  
Household equipment – Small and major appliances, textiles and furniture and other 
equipment bought by the household.  
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Health insurance – It could be argued that this is not strictly a public good since it is 
often bought at an individual level. But it does include children’s health insurance 
which arguably is a public good the same way children’s clothing is. Furthermore, 
seeing as the family intrinsically contains an element of insurance for its members, 
health insurance for one member will to a certain extent benefit all members.  
For a complete mapping of UCC codes to the dependent variables, see appendix B. 
4.1.4 Is individual income an exogenous variable? 
In the literature, considerable concern has been raised regarding the use of income, or relative 
income, as an independent variable and distribution factor (Ermisch 2003 p. 45; Browning et 
al 2011 p. 226; Rode 2011). The problems are related to which type of income that should be 
considered and their respective endogeneity issues. Monthly or yearly salaries are related to 
present time allocation decisions which in turn are – if we are to put our trust in economic 
theory – functions of prices and other sources of income. It has been suggested that total 
income should form the basis for calculating relative income (Ermisch 2003 p. 46), but it too 
is a function of time decisions, particularly past saving and investment behaviour. In theory, 
potential income could mitigate some of the problems because it reflects what a family 
member can threaten to do. But in addition to being correlated with past investments in 
human capital, it would require data that are not readily available.  
Addressing the endogeneity problem in a satisfactory manner is a difficult task that lies 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, in the sample I have kept only households where 
both spouses are registered as being in full time employment. In addition, I have included 
weekly hours worked by the husband and the wife respectively in the control variables. That 
might help reduce the problem, though clearly without solving it.  
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4.1.5 Summary statistics 
This section contains summary statistics on budget shares and control variables. In addition I 
pay particular attention to the wife’s relative income, which I denote by ρ (rho). Starting with 
the latter, Figure 9 shows the distribution of ρ in intervals of 0.025. Seeing as I have only 
included households were both spouses are in full time employment, the distribution of the 
wife’s relative income is relatively centred around its mean of 0.45. It is also evident from 
Figure 9 that there are very few observations near ρ = 0 and ρ =1. Estimates of the impact of 
the wife’s relative income near either end of the spectrum will therefore be limited in 
precision.  
As discussed in section 4.1.4, there are endogeneity issues associated with ρ and prices in the 
labour market because they may affect couples’ time decisions. It is noteworthy, though, that 
the correlation between ρ and total expenditures (that will be used for calculating budget 
shares) is very low (-0.05). That suggests that households where the wife receives a larger 
share of reported income are on average neither richer nor poorer than other households. 
 
Figure 10: The distribution of ρ 
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Table 1: Summary of demographic and other control variables 
Variable Mean Std. dev.  Min  Max 
Husband age 38.8 7.4 23 64 
Wife age 36.7 6.7 22 55 
Children < 2 years 0.22 0.43 0 2 
Children 2 to 15 years 1.50 0.83 0 4 
Children total* 1.72 0.73 1 4 
Weekly hours husband 45.3 8.9 35 95 
Weekly hours wife 41.6 5.7 35 84 
 Husband Wife 
Frequency Per cent Frequency Per cent 
Race White 647 79.7 655 80.7 
Race Black  86 10.6 70 8.6 
Race Asian 72 8.9 66 8.1 
Race Other 7 0.9 21 2.6 
No education beyond high school 387 47.7 317 39.0 
Some education beyond high school 425 52.3 495 61.0 
Master’s degree and beyond 111 13.7 158 19.5 
 Frequency Per cent 
House owner 658 81.0 
Region Northeast 142 17.5 
Region Midwest 197 24.3 
Region West 185 22.8 
Region South 288 35.5 
Metropolitan residence 730 89.9 
* For reference only (not included in the estimations) 
Table 1 shows an overview of control variables that can reasonably be thought to affect 
preferences. We see that the sample is predominantly white (80%), and that the average age is 
39 for husbands and 37 for wives. Couples have on average just under two children, and no 
couple has more than four. Husbands work on average almost four hours more per week than 
wives do, while wives are on average better educated.  
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The Bureau of Labor Surveys record even more detailed information in categories such as 
education and homeowner status, but given the relatively small sample size I have combined 
several finer categories into broader ones so as to reduce the chance of noise affecting 
estimates. 
Table 2: Budget share and income variables 
Variable Mean Std. dev.  Min Max 
Children’s clothing 0.009 0.010 0 0.058 
Household operations 0.052 0.067 0 0.037 
Health insurance 0.035 0.040 0 0.337 
Household Equipment 0.021 0.038 0 0.306 
Wife’s income 48467 27141 1 245000 
Husband’s income 60888 35579 60 275000 
Total expenditures 17904 8712 4535 85169 
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the budget shares relating to the household public 
goods and the income variables used for calculating ρ. Notably, husbands make on average 
roughly 12000 dollars a year more than wives do. As can also be seen from Table 2, the data 
is quite noisy with respect to budget shares. This may be due to infrequency bias, recall bias 
or both. For every expenditure category except household operations, the number of zero-
observations is in excess of 200. For household operations the number of zero-observations is 
65. Whether the zero-observations reflect spending behaviour or poor memory is hard to tell. 
Although the Bureau of Labor Surveys distinguishes between complete and incomplete 
income reporters, there is no equivalent classification with respect to expenditures. Dropping 
households that reported zero spending in one or more categories would reduce the sample to 
332 households which would constitute a very small sample. In addition, it might have 
removed a considerable amount of true zero-observations as well, and thereby traded one kind 
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of bias for another. I therefore decided to keep households with zero budget shares for one or 
more expenditure categories. 
4.2 Estimations 
4.2.1 The model 
In the theory section I presented three classes of non-unitary models and different variants of 
them depending on the structure of preferences. Each variant predicts a different spending 
pattern as a function of the wife’s share of income (see Figure 9, section 3.4). In linear terms, 
the models predict different combinations of flat segments and sloped segments. The true 
demand functions need of course not be linear, but it seems like a reasonable approximation 
for testing between alternative models. It also allows for using continuous piecewise linear 
regression as a starting point, a procedure that is readily available in modern statistical 
software.17 The general model is as follows:  
 ( )
1
n
i
i i ij ij i
j
S f Xα ρ β ε
=
= + + +∑  (4.1) 
Si is the budget share for good i. f  is a function describing the relationship between the wife’s 
share of income, ρ, and the budget share for good i. The next term is the set of explanatory 
variables other than ρ. This includes spouses’ age, demographic variables, the log of total 
expenditures and its square.  
4.2.2 Estimation procedure 
The main questions regarding the estimates are: Does ρ have a significant impact? Are there 
any kink points with respect to ρ? How many kink points are there? And where are they?  
There are probably many ways one could go about to answer these questions, particularly 
when it comes to searching for kink points. Rather than searching for kink points manually, I 
decided to adopt a procedure partly based on what is commonly known as a brute-force 
search. In essence, the procedure involves testing all possible combinations of inputs until 
                                                            
17
 Estimations were carried out using STATA 11. 
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one finds the optimal result. In the context of my estimations, the procedure can be briefly 
described as follows: 
1) Divide the observations of ρ into a theoretical set of intervals with lengths 0.025. Let 
the join points be the potential kink points. 
2) Impose the restrictions associated with the predicted spending pattern from a variant 
of a particular model (e.g. “flat-slope” or “slope-flat-slope”) in the f-function. 
3) Estimate the model using OLS with robust variance estimators for all possible 
combinations (if any) of potential kink points. 
4) Select the combination of kink points (if any) that yields the highest R2.  
5) Repeat the steps for each possible combination of flat and sloped segments.  
6) Test the variants against each other for statistical significance using a combination of 
F-tests, J-tests and CPD-tests (see section 4.2.3).  
Steps 1) to 5) was carried out using an algorithm written for Stata 11. Step 6) was for the most 
part done manually based on the results from the previous steps. The reason for this is that 
initial results would indicate which models (if any) seemed like good candidates, and testing 
all model variants against each other seemed impractical and redundant. When pitting the 
model variants against one another, I let the fact that adding kink points by itself often will 
produce a better fit have implications in the following sense; the null hypothesis would be that 
the model with fewer kink points was the best fit. This was also important for the 
interpretation of the results. 
4.2.3 The J-test and the CPD-test 
Both the J-test and the CPD-test are designed to compare the possible truth of two non-nested 
models that have the same response variable but differ in their regressor lists (Baum 2006 p. 
100; MacKinnon 2006 p. 1). That the models are non-nested means that you cannot impose 
one or more restrictions on one of the models in order to get the second model (otherwise a 
Wald-test could be used). The method of the J-test (aka Davidson-MacKinnon-test) can be 
described as follows (Baum 2006 p. 100). Consider two competing models, (1) and (2), that 
have the same dependent variable but different independent variables. The J-test runs both 
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regressions and predicts the fitted values. It then treats the fitted values from model (1) as an 
independent variable in an augmented regression of model (2) and vice versa for model (1). 
The estimated coefficients on the fitted values are then tested for significance using a standard 
t-test. The logic is that if the fitted values of model (1) have significant explanatory power in 
model (2), this is interpreted in favour of model (1) being the superior model – and vice versa. 
This means that it is possible that one model is rejected in favour of the other, that both are 
rejected or that neither is rejected, in which case the test is considered inconclusive.  
The CPD-test (aka Cox-Pesaran-Deaton-test) is more complicated, but the general idea is that 
one can test the validity of model (1) by comparing the observed value of the log-likelihood 
function for model (2) with an estimate of what the latter should be if model (1) is true 
(Davidson and MacKinnon 1985 p. 46). Both the J-test and the CPD-test can be implemented 
in Stata using the nnest-package.  
4.2.4 Restrictions regarding possible kink points 
In addition to the restrictions associated with the combinations of flat and sloped segments, 
several other restrictions were imposed. I restricted the kink points to be in the interval [0.2, 
0.8]. There are several reasons for this. First, the observations of ρ is such that estimating kink 
points near the ends of the spectrum is difficult since there are relatively few observations in 
those intervals. Second, any arbitrary concentration of a few high or low observations near the 
ends of the spectrum might give rise to local kink points that could distort the overall results. 
It could also be added that any kink points near the end points are likely to be caused by 
Becker-regions, and it seems reasonable to expect them, if present, to extend to at least the 
neighbourhood of ρ =0.02 or ρ=0.8. Furthermore, I restricted the kink points to be at least 
0.075 apart. This means for instance that any estimated Warr-region will be at least 0.075 
“long” in terms of ρ, which seems reasonable. It also means assuming that if the wife’s share 
of income is indeed a distribution factor in the collective model (or in the Nash model) for a 
sub-interval of [0 , 1], that sub-interval is at least 0.075 long. The restriction also contributes 
to setting the different model variants apart from one another. After all, the point of the 
exercise is to investigate whether one type of model fits the data significantly better than do 
others, and that would be hard to do if models are very similar. If I had allowed kink points to 
”stack up”, clusters of observations could produce results across models that were hard to 
interpret. Consider the following example: If the true model is the collective model with 
47 
 
Becker-regions (flat-slope-flat) and kink points 0.025 apart, then identifying it using the data 
at hand is next to impossible given that one would always wonder whether the estimated 
results came from the data or the true model. But if the aforementioned model is the one 
producing the data, it would still be reasonable to expect that an estimated collective model 
with kink points 0.075 apart would fit the data better than, say, a model with only a slope.  
All the restrictions discussed were incorporated in the algorithm that estimated the different 
model variants according to the following table (see also Figure 9, section 3.4). 
Table 3: Overview of the different model variants estimated 
Shape Kink 
points 
Corresponding model(s) Number of 
combinations 
(flat) - Control variables only (unitary) 1 
slope - Collective, both egotistic 1 
flat-slope 1 Collective, husband deferential 21 
slope-flat 1 Collective model, wife deferential 21 
flat-slope-flat 2 Collective model, both deferential 253 
slope-flat-slope 2 Non-cooperative and Nash-bargaining, 
both egotistic 
253 
flat-slope-flat-slope 3 Non-cooperative and Nash-bargaining, 
husband deferential 
1330 
slope-flat-slope-flat 3 Non-cooperative and Nash-bargaining, 
wife deferential 
1330 
slope-flat-slope-flat-slope 4 Non-cooperative and Nash-bargaining, 
both deferential 
3876 
  SUM REGRESSIONS 7086 
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Note that even though the non-cooperative models and the Nash-bargaining models fall in the 
same general shape categories, they differ with respect to the signs on the slopes. For 
instance, the basic non-cooperative model is “negative-flat-positive” whereas the Nash-
bargaining model is either “positive-flat-positive” or “negative-flat-negative” (depending on 
which spouse has the strongest preference for the good). This means that as the “best” slope-
flat-slope model is selected, one variant will implicitly be rejected given the estimated signs 
on the slope coefficients. The same goes for the other “pairs” of models.  
As a cross-check, I also estimated a model for each good using control variables only, i.e. 
dropping f(ρ) from the right hand side of (4.1). I then computed the fitted values and the 
corresponding residuals from this model before doing a (non-parametric) second order local 
polynomial regression with local-mean smoothing18 on the residuals using ρ as the 
independent variable. The logic is that once the control variables are accounted for, the impact 
of ρ can be approximately traced out using this method. It can therefore be used to cross-
check the shape and the location of the estimated kink points (if any) of the preferred linear 
model. Plots of these auxiliary regressions are included in chapter 5. 
                                                            
18
 In Stata, this corresponds to using the lpoly-command with the epanechnikov-kernel and standard options. 
49 
 
5 Results 
5.1 Overview 
This chapter presents results from the estimations and a discussion of possible interpretations. 
Separate regressions were run for each household public good to allow for decision processes 
and/or preferences to differ across goods. Results are presented for one good at a time along 
with plots of the preferred linear models and the local polynomial regressions. The plots serve 
to illustrate the estimated impact on demand for the different public goods of the intra-
household income distribution. The discussion follows after the presentation of the results 
themselves. Detailed estimation results for the preferred linear models can be found in      
Appendix A.  
For three of the four household public goods, the estimations returned statistically significant 
results with respect to the wife’s share of income, ρ. These are children’s clothing, household 
operations and health insurance. For household equipment, the wife’s share of income does 
not have a statistically significant impact. The tests between the alternative linear models 
returned results that were indicative, but not entirely conclusive. Given the limited number of 
observations at relatively high or low values of ρ, some of the results rely on few observations 
and are hard to interpret. The fact that certain sloped segments in a model are statistically 
significant does not in itself justify economic interpretation. Deciding which of the linear 
models had the best fit thus turned out to be less than straightforward.  May 13th  
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5.2 Children’s clothing 
For the household’s budget share on children’s clothing, ρ seems to have an effect, but tests 
on which of the non-unitary models that fit the best are not conclusive. The local polynomial 
regression suggests a downward sloping trend with at least one possible kink point around 
ρ=0.2.  
The collective model with egotistic preferences (slope-only) has a slope coefficient that is 
significant at the 1% level (Figure 12, top panel). The preferred model with kink points is the 
Nash bargaining model where the wife has deferential preferences (Figure 12, bottom panel), 
and the slope-only model is rejected at the 1% level against this model using both a J-test and 
a CPD-test. But the results seem to rely on the relatively few observations of ρ<0.2 (28 
observations). There are no extreme values in this interval; it is just that the average budget 
share in this interval is relatively higher. Whether this is coincidental or not is impossible to 
Figure 11: Children’s clothing, local polynomial regression 
Explanation of the above plot: The line is a second order local polynomial regression using local-
mean smoothing on the residuals from the model with control variables only. The circles 
represent the average residual from the observations of rho rounded to the nearest 0.025. The 
size of each circle is proportional to the number of observations for each point. 
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Figure 12: Children’s clothing, linear models 
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tell. I ran the estimation algorithm 
on a sample where I dropped the 
observations for ρ<0.2. In that 
case, the Nash model no longer 
was the preferred model – the 
collective model with deferential 
preferences was (Figure 12, 
middle panel). Incidentally, if the 
coefficient on the leftmost slope 
of the preferred Nash-model is 
restricted to zero, that model 
effectively becomes a collective 
model with deferential 
preferences. This shows how the 
Nash bargaining model being the 
statistically preferred model relies 
on those few observations for low 
values of ρ. 
It is therefore difficult to 
conclude which of the linear 
models that shows the best fit. I 
do, however, interpret the overall 
results as evidence against the 
unitary model.  
  
Explanation of the above plots: The solid lines are the predicted values from the model when the 
control variables are set to their respective means. The 95% confidence intervals are generated 
using the robust variance estimates for the slope coefficients for each linear segment. 
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5.3 Household operations 
Household operations is a service-oriented expenditure category that includes cleaning and 
gardening services, internet and computer services, babysitting and childcare. The estimated 
impact of ρ is significant, but this has a lot to do with services relating to children.  
The local polynomial regression yields a rather strange “inverted” shape that is inconsistent 
with theory. This may very well be because of the few observations near the end points being 
coincidentally low, so it’s hard to interpret the “dips” result as evidence against anything. In 
the interval [0.2 , 0.8] where most of the observations are, there is a positive trend and the 
estimated collective model with egotistic preferences (slope-only) has a significant slope 
coefficient of 0.034 (p-value is 0.025). In other words; the low values near the end points do 
not cancel out the positive trend in the middle segment. Of the models with kink points, the 
preferred model is the collective model where both spouses have deferential preferences. The 
slope-only collective model is rejected against this variant using both a J-test and a CPD-test. 
But there is no sign of the rather steep slope in the lpoly-estimation, which I think is a sign 
that the results from the J-test and the CPD-test should be interpreted with caution. As for the 
Figure 13: Household operations, local polynomial regression 
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Figure 14: Household operations, linear models 
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other model variants, three of them19 showed the same inverted shape as the lpoly-plot, which 
means that the estimated signs on one or more slope coefficients were inconsistent with 
theory. This may simply be a result of overfitting near the end points, but is nevertheless not 
supportive of the corresponding models. The collective model with flat segments was not 
rejected against any of the “strange” variants, but in two instances the results were 
inconclusive in the sense that the competing model was not decisively rejected either.  
It should be noted, however,           
that the positive slope depends on 
babysitting and child care being 
present in the aggregate dependent  
variable. Remove the childcare 
categories from “household 
operations” and the basic 
collective model will not cause the 
unitary model to be rejected. The 
collective model with flat 
segments will, however, but with 
the opposite sign on the slope. 
This illustrates how much of an 
impact child services has for the 
results.  
 
  
                                                            
19
 The models were slope-flat slope and the two variants with three kink points. The model with four kink 
points had consistent signs (positive-positive), but was rejected against the preferred collective variant.  
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5.4 Household Equipment 
Household equipment includes small and major appliances, furniture, textiles and other 
miscellaneous equipment. For this expenditure category, the estimated effects of the wife’s 
share of income are next to none.  
 
The above plot indicates no impact of ρ on the demand for household equipment. This was 
confirmed by the slope-only model estimate that had an insignificant slope coefficient 
(p=0.422). As for the model with kink points, the algorithm returned model estimates where 
some had slope signs inconsistent with theory in addition to most of the coefficients being 
insignificant. In addition, the J-tests and the C-P tests were inconclusive in the sense that none 
of the kink-point models were strictly preferred over the others. This is evidence against ρ 
having a significant impact in this expenditure category.  
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Figure 15: Household equipment, local polynomial regression 
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5.5 Health insurance 
As briefly discussed in section 4.1.3, health insurance is both private and public in nature. 
Plans are available for individuals as well as families, but the fact that health insurance for 
one individual to an extent benefits all family members means that even the individual plans 
have properties consistent with being public goods. Health insurance for children is arguably 
a public good to the parents. A possible problem with the reported data in this category is that 
a number of households might have plans paid for by their employer, and may or may not 
interpret these as expenditures. Nevertheless, the estimations suggest that when the wife 
receives a larger share of household income, more is spent on health insurance.  
 
The local polynomial regression is similar in shape to that for household-operations in the 
sense that it has a positive trend in the middle but a “dip” for high values of ρ. This “dip” is 
inconsistent with theory, but is driven by the sparse observations at the upper end of the scale. 
The preferred linear model is the collective model with deferential preferences, but the kink 
points are not indicated by the lpoly-plot. The kink points are also as close together as the 
algorithm permits, which may be a sign of local overfitting. None of the models with more 
Figure 16: Health Insurance, local polynomial regression 
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Figure 17: Health Insurance, linear models 
kink points gave an improvement over 
this model. Notably, the Nash model with 
four kink points, the flat-slope-flat 
model with an additional flat Warr-
region in the middle, was rejected 
against the model with only two 
kink points using a J-test (the CPD-
test was inconclusive). But the slope 
only-model was rejected against the 
four-point model, so being cautious 
about the slope-flat-slope model 
means that one cannot rule out the 
Nash-model completely.  
The slope coefficient in the slope-
only model is significant at the 1% 
level, so the unitary model is 
rejected on that basis alone. The 
estimate suggests that for every 10 
per cent of household income that 
the wife controls, the budget share 
on health insurance increases 0.25 
percentage points. In the 
corresponding model with 
deferential preferences, the budget 
share increases roughly one 
percentage point from ρ=0.425 to 
ρ=0.5. In total, this indicates that 
households where the wife receives 
relatively more income spend more 
on health insurance, but given the 
uncertainties about the models, the 
effect is hard to quantify.  
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5.6 Summary of results 
Overall, the results points towards a rejection of the unitary model and the income pooling 
hypothesis. The wife’s share of household income has a statistically significant impact for 
three of the four goods. Of the three alternative models, the collective model is the one that 
most consistently stands out as a preferred alternative. Some of the results indicate deferential 
preferences, but it is hard to make any definite conclusions. This is partly due to the lack of 
observations for high or low values of ρ, and partly because of the rather small sample size. 
The latter is important because the smaller the sample size, the more estimates of kink points 
may be vulnerable to local clusters of high or low budget shares. That means that deferential 
preferences may be statistically preferred more because of local overfitting than anything else. 
It is interesting to note that the non-cooperative model is virtually absent from the linear 
estimates. In other words; I find no signs of a flat Warr-region surrounded by upward sloping 
segments for any of the goods. The estimation procedure “forces” a slope-flat-slope model to 
be estimated for each good in order for it to be tested against other variants, but the returned 
estimates were either a Nash model (see Figure 9, section 3.4) or inconsistent with theory. 
None of the more complicated models with three kink points or more gave an improvement, 
except for in the children’s clothing category. But seeing as that particular result relies on a 
very small number of observations for low values of ρ, I am cautious about its significance. 
The Nash model was not a preferred model for any other goods. It should be noted, however, 
that in testing the models against one another, the null hypothesis was always that it was the 
model with fewer kink points that was the preferred model. If it really is a Nash model with 
deferential preferences that is generating the data, the sample size may be too small and/or the 
noise too great for the Nash model to stand out statistically. 
As for the non-result in the household equipment-category, there may be several reasons why 
the wife’s share of income does not play a part. One possibility is that the unitary model is the 
correct model for this category of household expenditure. Another might be that private 
preferences on average cancel out because household equipment is a very broad expenditure 
category. For instance, let’s say that traditional gender stereotypes are relevant in this context, 
and that men on average prefer upgrading the household’s power tools and lawn mower to 
upgrading the food processor and the curtains – and that for women it is the other way 
58 
 
around.20 It is then possible that the spouse with the largest share of household income is able 
to push the budget in the direction he or she wants, but that the overall equipment budget does 
not change. Testing for such an effect, however, would mean assigning the 71 UCC-codes 
that make up “household equipment” to a specific gender, which seems overly conjectural. It 
could also be that private preferences cancel out in a way not associated with gender 
stereotypes. A third possibility is that because household equipment includes durables such as 
stoves and sofas,21 the infrequency bias might generate so much noise in the data that any 
effects from differences in bargaining power would be effectively undetectable in the 
snapshot of a cross-section.   
As for the three goods where the estimated impact of the wife’s share of income was 
significant, one result in particular is a bit puzzling, namely that for the budget share for 
children’s clothing. The reason is that the estimated effect is the opposite of what is found in 
other studies (Lundberg et al 1997; Browning and Lechene 2001). According to my estimates 
of the collective model, when the wife’s share of income is 10 percentage points higher, the 
budget share on children’s clothing is on average reduced by 0.08 percentage points. That is 
not much, of course, but it is still a bit surprising. It would seem that within the sample, the 
men have on average a stronger preference for children’s clothing than do women. It is also 
worth mentioning that all model variants returned signs on the sloped segments that were 
consistent with this, even those models that were rejected against other models. 
  
                                                            
20
 See section 5.7 for an experiment with this line of thought. 
21
 I did experiment with removing all «big items» from the dependent variable, but it rendered the budget 
shares too small to do any meaningful estimations.   
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Figure 18: TV, radio and sound equipment, local polynomial regression 
5.7 Bonus track: TV, radio and sound equipment 
This category is not among the goods listed in section 4.1.3, because ex ante it is hard to 
characterize it as either a public good or a private good. It is public in the sense that someone 
turning on the stereo does not preclude anyone from listening to the same music. But it 
becomes private if that person puts on a set of headphones. Following my own gender 
stereotypes in the household equipment-category (section 5.46), I thought it would be 
interesting to see if the budget shares were consistent with the casual observation that men 
have a stronger preference for big screen TV’s and expensive hifi-equipment. It turns out that 
the data lend support to this claim.  
 
 
The local polynomial regression shows clear signs that the budget share decreases as the wife 
controls more of household income. It also suggests that this effect is stronger for smaller 
shares of the wife’s income. The slope-only model has a coefficient that is significant at the 
0.1% level, but this is rejected against the slope-flat model with the kink point located at 
ρ=0.5. This corresponds to the collective model where the wife has deferential preferences. In 
other words; as the wife’s share of income increases, the budget share for TV, radio and 
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Figure 19: TV, radio and sound equipment, linear 
models 
sound equipment decreases down to 
the point where she controls half of 
household income. None of the 
models with more kink points 
gave a significant improvement 
over the slope-flat model.  
It is interesting that none of the 
control variables produced 
significant coefficients. In the 
context of the collective model 
with deferential preferences, the 
budget share is reduced by 0.3 
percentage points for every 10% 
of household income received 
by the wife (up to 50%). It 
would seem that big TVs and 
expensive sound equipment 
really are ”boys’ toys” after all. 
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6 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis is about modelling family behaviour in an economic context. As the amount of 
evidence against the standard unitary model has grown, economists have searched for better 
ways of describing how families make use of scarce resources and what drives the decision 
process. In the theory section, I presented several alternatives to the unitary model of family 
behaviour. I demonstrated how different assumptions about the family decision process and 
family member’s preferences lead to radically different predictions about how intra-household 
income distribution affects household demand.  
In the empirical section, I presented a method for estimating the various model variants and 
testing which one best fits the data. I then applied this method to a sample of 812 married 
couples with children using data sets from the US Consumer Expenditure Survey 2010. After 
controlling for a range of demographic and other variables, I estimated the impact of the 
wife’s share of household income on four expenditure categories that reasonably could be 
classified as household public goods.  
Overall, the results were in line with previous rejections of the unitary model and the income 
pooling hypothesis. I have found several indications of the collective model being an 
appropriate replacement. Furthermore, the results suggest that deferential preferences could 
be an appropriate representation of the observed behaviour, but the number of couples with 
highly skewed income distribution were too limited to conclude one way or the other. 
Corresponding to the evidence in favour of the collective model, I found no evidence of the 
non-cooperative model being an active player in this field. The only signs I found of a Warr-
region being present pointed towards the Nash-model, but these signs were few and 
ambiguous at best. 
As previously discussed, the results are definitely not conclusive. The data set is quite noisy, 
the sample is rather small and the number of households reporting zero budget shares for 
major expenditure categories adds to the uncertainty. In addition, there are unresolved 
endogeneity issues associated with intra-family income distribution, which means treating the 
wife’s share of income as an independent variable has its drawbacks. It should also be said 
that by using cross-sectional data, I have effectively ignored the time dimension in the 
analysis. Intertemporal models of family behaviour might be able to explain observed 
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behaviour better than any of the models I put to the test. If family members are forward-
looking, not only current bargaining power but also the prospect of future bargaining power 
could affect decisions today.   
It is also worth bearing in mind that several possible distribution factors other than relative 
income are unaccounted for in my analysis, simply because of lack of data. Possible 
distributions factors could be potential earnings, savings and capital income, marriage market 
attributes, divorce laws and social customs. These distribution factors may or may not be 
correlated with relative income, and could have altered the picture if they were present in the 
data.  
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Appendix A: Detailed results 
Children's clothing 
Collective model, egotistic preferences 
 
Coefficient Robust SE t-stat p-value 
rho -0,0077159 0,0028695 -2,69 0,007 
ln (Total Expenditures) 0,0355225 0,0220574 1,61 0,108 
[ln (Total Expenditures)]^2 -0,0019458 0,001113 -1,75 0,081 
Husband hours worked per week 0,0000291 0,0000399 0,73 0,466 
Wife hours worked per week 0,0002316 0,000073 3,17 0,002 
Husband age -0,0000712 0,0000913 -0,78 0,436 
Wife age -0,0002309 0,000555 -0,42 0,677 
Wife age^2 0,0000048 0,0000069 0,69 0,490 
Husband education beyond high school -0,0019993 0,0009119 -2,19 0,029 
Husband master's degree and beyond 0,0001279 0,0012075 0,11 0,916 
Wife education beyond high school 0,0004433 0,0009412 0,47 0,638 
Wife master's degree and beyond -0,0012429 0,0009443 -1,32 0,188 
Children under 2 years 0,0065777 0,0011042 5,96 0,000 
Children 2 to 15 years 0,0021907 0,0005739 3,82 0,000 
Houseowner 0,0012493 0,0009906 1,26 0,208 
Region Midwest 0,0011762 0,0011172 1,05 0,293 
Region South -0,0005643 0,0010141 -0,56 0,578 
Region West -0,0002562 0,0010174 -0,25 0,801 
Metropolitan residence -0,0025406 0,0015406 -1,65 0,100 
Husband black -0,0012013 0,0020785 -0,58 0,563 
Wife black 0,0035072 0,0024173 1,45 0,147 
Husband Asian 0,0032469 0,0018877 1,72 0,086 
Wife Asian -0,0028387 0,0018075 -1,57 0,117 
Wife other -0,000442 0,0024201 -0,18 0,855 
Husband other 0,0065822 0,0050172 1,31 0,190 
_cons -0,1577653 0,1064866 -1,48 0,139 
     Number of obs. 812 
   R2 0,1166 
   F(25, 786) 3,81 
   Prob > F 0,0000 
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Children's clothing 
Collective model, deferential preferences 
 
 Coefficient Robust SE t-stat p-value 
rho: (0.2 , 0.65) -0,0080350 0,0034359 -2,34 0,020 
ln (Total Expenditures) 0,0346722 0,0220432 1,57 0,116 
[ln (Total Expenditures)]^2 -0,0019043 0,0011119 -1,71 0,087 
Husband hours worked per week 0,0000321 0,0000399 0,80 0,421 
Wife hours worked per week 0,0002281 0,0000736 3,10 0,002 
Husband age -0,0000722 0,0000920 -0,79 0,433 
Wife age -0,0002398 0,0005555 -0,43 0,666 
Wife age^2 0,0000049 0,0000069 0,70 0,482 
Husband education beyond high school -0,0019604 0,0009155 -2,14 0,033 
Husband master's degree and beyond 0,0001753 0,0012043 0,15 0,884 
Wife education beyond high school 0,0004294 0,0009414 0,46 0,648 
Wife master's degree and beyond -0,0012486 0,0009447 -1,32 0,187 
Children under 2 years 0,0066210 0,0011076 5,98 0,000 
Children 2 to 15 years 0,0022145 0,0005766 3,84 0,000 
Houseowner 0,0012779 0,0009920 1,29 0,198 
Region Midwest 0,0011229 0,0011172 1,01 0,315 
Region South -0,0005783 0,0010158 -0,57 0,569 
Region West -0,0002418 0,0010181 -0,24 0,812 
Metropolitan residence -0,0026209 0,0015515 -1,69 0,092 
Husband black -0,0012274 0,0020844 -0,59 0,556 
Wife black 0,0034863 0,0024144 1,44 0,149 
Husband Asian 0,0031568 0,0018835 1,68 0,094 
Wife Asian -0,0028239 0,0018076 -1,56 0,119 
Wife other -0,0003262 0,0024208 -0,13 0,893 
Husband other 0,0062667 0,0050141 1,25 0,212 
_cons -0,1546437 0,1064464 -1,45 0,147 
  
   
  
   Number of obs. 812 
   R2 0,1144 
   F(26, 785) 3,76 
   Prob > F  0,0000 
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Children's clothing 
Nash-bargaining model, egotistic preferences 
 
Coefficient Robust SE t-stat p-value 
rho: (0 , 0.2) -0,058881 0,022230 -2,65 0,008 
rho: (0.5 , 0.575) -0,028518 0,011808 -2,42 0,016 
ln (Total Expenditures) 0,041662 0,022543 1,85 0,065 
[ln (Total Expenditures)]^2 -0,002252 0,001139 -1,98 0,048 
Husband hours worked per week 0,000025 0,000041 0,61 0,539 
Wife hours worked per week 0,000228 0,000071 3,22 0,001 
Husband age -0,000071 0,000092 -0,77 0,442 
Wife age -0,000202 0,000554 -0,36 0,715 
Wife age^2 0,000004 0,000007 0,62 0,534 
Husband education beyond high school -0,002063 0,000902 -2,29 0,023 
Husband master's degree and beyond 0,000364 0,001199 0,30 0,761 
Wife education beyond high school 0,000493 0,000948 0,52 0,603 
Wife master's degree and beyond -0,001360 0,000915 -1,49 0,138 
Children under 2 years 0,006266 0,001094 5,73 0,000 
Children 2 to 15 years 0,002108 0,000568 3,71 0,000 
Houseowner 0,001392 0,000993 1,40 0,161 
Region Midwest 0,001402 0,001119 1,25 0,211 
Region South -0,000570 0,001012 -0,56 0,573 
Region West -0,000200 0,001018 -0,20 0,844 
Metropolitan residence -0,002262 0,001491 -1,52 0,130 
Husband black -0,000888 0,002068 -0,43 0,668 
Wife black 0,003275 0,002425 1,35 0,177 
Husband Asian 0,003150 0,001917 1,64 0,101 
Wife Asian -0,002941 0,001826 -1,61 0,108 
Wife other 0,000078 0,002491 0,03 0,975 
Husband other 0,006196 0,005115 1,21 0,226 
_cons -0,180205 0,108433 -1,66 0,097 
     Number of obs. 812 
   R2 0,1290 
   F(26, 785) 4,01 
   Prob > F  0,0000 
   
 
  
69 
 
Household Operations 
Collective model, egotistic preferences 
 
Coefficient Robust SE t-stat p-value 
rho 0,034083 0,015152 2,25 0,025 
ln (Total Expenditures) 0,272995 0,137604 1,98 0,048 
[ln (Total Expenditures)]^2 -0,013349 0,007084 -1,88 0,060 
Husband hours worked per week -0,000228 0,000259 -0,88 0,378 
Wife hours worked per week -0,000046 0,000392 -0,12 0,906 
Husband age -0,001043 0,000508 -2,05 0,041 
Wife age 0,001436 0,002980 0,48 0,630 
Wife age^2 -0,000032 0,000036 -0,89 0,373 
Husband education beyond high school 0,008025 0,005063 1,58 0,113 
Husband master's degree and beyond -0,001661 0,008604 -0,19 0,847 
Wife education beyond high school 0,008903 0,004893 1,82 0,069 
Wife master's degree and beyond 0,035453 0,007957 4,46 0,000 
Children under 2 years 0,021310 0,007493 2,84 0,005 
Children 2 to 15 years 0,005433 0,002921 1,86 0,063 
Houseowner 0,007165 0,005479 1,31 0,191 
Region Midwest 0,017277 0,007359 2,35 0,019 
Region South 0,012813 0,006725 1,91 0,057 
Region West 0,004782 0,006878 0,70 0,487 
Metropolitan residence 0,006857 0,007514 0,91 0,362 
Husband black 0,015296 0,012254 1,25 0,212 
Wife black -0,024232 0,013361 -1,81 0,070 
Husband Asian -0,003841 0,014935 -0,26 0,797 
Wife Asian -0,006120 0,014806 -0,41 0,679 
Wife other -0,011992 0,008329 -1,44 0,150 
Husband other 0,013141 0,020048 0,66 0,512 
_cons -1,356899 0,671296 -2,02 0,044 
     Number of obs. 812 
   R2 0,1955 
   F(25, 786) 8,16 
   Prob > F 0,0000 
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Household Operations 
Collective model, deferential preferences 
 
Coefficient Robust SE t-stat p-value 
rho: (0.225 , 0.3) 0,417554 0,0968376 4,31 0,000 
ln (Total Expenditures) 0,286633 0,1342075 2,14 0,033 
[ln (Total Expenditures)]^2 -0,013989 0,0068995 -2,03 0,043 
Husband hours worked per week -0,000245 0,0002576 -0,95 0,342 
Wife hours worked per week -0,000009 0,000401 -0,02 0,982 
Husband age -0,000940 0,0005063 -1,86 0,064 
Wife age 0,001559 0,0029868 0,52 0,602 
Wife age^2 -0,000034 0,0000361 -0,95 0,343 
Husband education beyond high school 0,007750 0,005014 1,55 0,123 
Husband master's degree and beyond -0,003733 0,0085317 -0,44 0,662 
Wife education beyond high school 0,007527 0,004906 1,53 0,125 
Wife master's degree and beyond 0,036675 0,0078599 4,67 0,000 
Children under 2 years 0,021407 0,0074276 2,88 0,004 
Children 2 to 15 years 0,006104 0,0029309 2,08 0,038 
Houseowner 0,007309 0,0054988 1,33 0,184 
Region Midwest 0,018414 0,0073289 2,51 0,012 
Region South 0,015122 0,0067089 2,25 0,024 
Region West 0,006431 0,0068749 0,94 0,350 
Metropolitan residence 0,004483 0,0073889 0,61 0,544 
Husband black 0,015228 0,0120042 1,27 0,205 
Wife black -0,025063 0,0131265 -1,91 0,057 
Husband Asian -0,005081 0,0149765 -0,34 0,735 
Wife Asian -0,005087 0,0146909 -0,35 0,729 
Wife other -0,009955 0,0089269 -1,12 0,265 
Husband other 0,012958 0,0201562 0,64 0,520 
_cons -1,447953 0,6550752 -2,21 0,027 
     Number of obs. 
 
812 
  R2 
 
0,2030 
  F(25, 786) 
 
8,17 
  Prob > F 
 
0,0000 
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Household Equipment 
Collective model, egotistic preferences 
 
Coefficient Robust SE t-stat p-value 
rho -0,007548 0,009392 -0,80 0,422 
ln (Total Expenditures) 0,195483 0,077200 2,53 0,012 
[ln (Total Expenditures)]^2 -0,009345 0,003968 -2,36 0,019 
Husband hours worked per week 0,000012 0,000188 0,07 0,948 
Wife hours worked per week -0,000036 0,000246 -0,15 0,884 
Husband age -0,000229 0,000355 -0,65 0,518 
Wife age -0,003268 0,002159 -1,51 0,131 
Wife age^2 0,000046 0,000028 1,68 0,094 
Husband education beyond high school 0,000990 0,004293 0,23 0,818 
Husband master's degree and beyond -0,001564 0,004541 -0,34 0,731 
Wife education beyond high school -0,001141 0,003900 -0,29 0,770 
Wife master's degree and beyond -0,005049 0,003708 -1,36 0,174 
Children under 2 years -0,003870 0,003792 -1,02 0,308 
Children 2 to 15 years -0,001940 0,002059 -0,94 0,346 
Houseowner 0,000317 0,003564 0,09 0,929 
Region Midwest 0,008503 0,004063 2,09 0,037 
Region South 0,012416 0,004226 2,94 0,003 
Region West 0,004078 0,003486 1,17 0,242 
Metropolitan residence -0,004036 0,005435 -0,74 0,458 
Husband black -0,000826 0,006055 -0,14 0,891 
Wife black -0,007995 0,007346 -1,09 0,277 
Husband Asian 0,013596 0,007433 1,83 0,068 
Wife Asian -0,014266 0,006725 -2,12 0,034 
Wife other -0,004118 0,007926 -0,52 0,604 
Husband other 0,000156 0,012031 0,01 0,990 
_cons -0,922720 0,370615 -2,49 0,013 
 
 
     
   Number of obs. 812 
   R2 0.0426 
   F(25, 786) 2,11 
   Prob > F 0,0013 
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Health Insurance 
Collective model, egotistic preferences 
 
Coefficient Robust SE t-stat p-value 
rho 0,0254036 0,0089729 2,83 0,005 
ln (Total Expenditures) 0,1530555 0,0983895 1,56 0,120 
[ln (Total Expenditures)]^2 -0,0084633 0,0050006 -1,69 0,091 
Husband hours worked per week -0,0001079 0,0001444 -0,75 0,455 
Wife hours worked per week -0,0004948 0,0002388 -2,07 0,039 
Husband age 0,0004613 0,0003347 1,38 0,168 
Wife age -0,0059482 0,0024534 -2,42 0,016 
Wife age^2 0,0000641 0,0000311 2,06 0,040 
Husband education beyond high school -0,0018386 0,0029433 -0,62 0,532 
Husband master's degree and beyond 0,0045275 0,0033953 1,33 0,183 
Wife education beyond high school -0,0012967 0,0033604 -0,39 0,700 
Wife master's degree and beyond 0,0031424 0,0030739 1,02 0,307 
Children under 2 years -0,0035098 0,0039869 -0,88 0,379 
Children 2 to 15 years 0,0037683 0,0018050 2,09 0,037 
Houseowner -0,0052775 0,0042506 -1,24 0,215 
Region Midwest 0,0086442 0,0043373 1,99 0,047 
Region South 0,0032387 0,0043353 0,75 0,455 
Region West 0,0028235 0,0046167 0,61 0,541 
Metropolitan residence 0,0057008 0,0047256 1,21 0,228 
Husband black -0,0187678 0,0082009 -2,29 0,022 
Wife black 0,0170958 0,0090525 1,89 0,059 
Husband Asian -0,0063727 0,0053951 -1,18 0,238 
Wife Asian -0,0081705 0,0050619 -1,61 0,107 
Wife other 0,0057045 0,0060623 0,94 0,347 
Husband other -0,0378350 0,0068677 -5,51 0,000 
_cons -0,5341291 0,4906517 -1,09 0,277 
     
     Number of obs. 812 
   R2 0.0859 
   F(25, 786) 3,78 
   Prob > F 0.0000 
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Health Insurance 
Collective model, deferential preferences 
 
Coefficient Robust SE t-stat p-value 
rho: (0.425 , 0.5) 0,1438125 0,0381212 3,77 0,000 
ln (Total Expenditures) 0,1616056 0,0970209 1,67 0,096 
[ln (Total Expenditures)]^2 -0,0088727 0,0049353 -1,80 0,073 
Husband hours worked per week -0,000089 0,0001421 -0,63 0,531 
Wife hours worked per week -0,0004885 0,0002353 -2,08 0,038 
Husband age 0,0005229 0,0003334 1,57 0,117 
Wife age -0,0058871 0,002428 -2,42 0,016 
Wife age^2 0,0000627 0,0000307 2,04 0,042 
Husband education beyond high school -0,001661 0,0029193 -0,57 0,570 
Husband master's degree and beyond 0,0051239 0,0034263 1,50 0,135 
Wife education beyond high school -0,0015261 0,0033362 -0,46 0,647 
Wife master's degree and beyond 0,0027516 0,0030621 0,90 0,369 
Children under 2 years -0,0033705 0,0039611 -0,85 0,395 
Children 2 to 15 years 0,0038202 0,0017882 2,14 0,033 
Houseowner -0,0058207 0,0041992 -1,39 0,166 
Region Midwest 0,0090987 0,0043826 2,08 0,038 
Region South 0,0034261 0,0043706 0,78 0,433 
Region West 0,0025491 0,0046021 0,55 0,580 
Metropolitan residence 0,0061204 0,0047171 1,30 0,195 
Husband black -0,0191329 0,0082568 -2,32 0,021 
Wife black 0,0180634 0,0091332 1,98 0,048 
Husband Asian -0,0058829 0,0054287 -1,08 0,279 
Wife Asian -0,0086991 0,0051406 -1,69 0,091 
Wife other 0,0050026 0,005959 0,84 0,401 
Husband other -0,0370346 0,0070868 -5,23 0,000 
_cons -0,576148 0,4836734 -1,19 0,234 
     
     Number of obs. 812 
   R2 0,0926 
   F(25, 786) 3,67 
   Prob > F 0.0000 
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Health Insurance 
Nash bargaining model, deferential preferences 
 
Coefficient Robust SE t-stat p-value 
rho: (0.2 , .0275) 0,1058415 0,0690678 1,53 0,126 
rho: (0.425 , 0.5) 0,132648 0,0395109 3,36 0,001 
ln (Total Expenditures) 0,1617085 0,0974677 1,66 0,097 
[ln (Total Expenditures)]^2 -0,0088643 0,0049586 -1,79 0,074 
Husband hours worked per week -0,0000766 0,0001425 -0,54 0,591 
Wife hours worked per week -0,0004962 0,0002336 -2,12 0,034 
Husband age 0,0005664 0,0003382 1,67 0,094 
Wife age -0,0059055 0,002433 -2,43 0,015 
Wife age^2 0,0000625 0,0000308 2,03 0,043 
Husband education beyond high school -0,0015872 0,0029171 -0,54 0,587 
Husband master's degree and beyond 0,0048234 0,0034445 1,40 0,162 
Wife education beyond high school -0,0019648 0,0033506 -0,59 0,558 
Wife master's degree and beyond 0,0028324 0,0030561 0,93 0,354 
Children under 2 years -0,0030878 0,0039649 -0,78 0,436 
Children 2 to 15 years 0,0041247 0,0018201 2,27 0,024 
Houseowner -0,0058367 0,004213 -1,39 0,166 
Region Midwest 0,0094029 0,0043869 2,14 0,032 
Region South 0,0038968 0,0043495 0,90 0,371 
Region West 0,0028395 0,0045844 0,62 0,536 
Metropolitan residence 0,0053473 0,0046663 1,15 0,252 
Husband black -0,0192443 0,0082032 -2,35 0,019 
Wife black 0,0179057 0,0090858 1,97 0,049 
Husband Asian -0,0060808 0,0053831 -1,13 0,259 
Wife Asian -0,0084534 0,0050801 -1,66 0,097 
Wife other 0,0056269 0,005848 0,96 0,336 
Husband other -0,0374156 0,0070988 -5,27 0,000 
_cons -0,5859162 0,4855111 -1,21 0,228 
     
     Number of obs. 812 
   R2 0.0941 
   F(25, 785) 3,57 
   Prob > F 0.0000 
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TV, radio and sound equipment 
Collective model, egotistic preferences 
 
Coefficient Robust SE t-stat p-value 
rho -0,0190316 0,0053153 -3,58 0,000 
ln (Total Expenditures) -0,0888220 0,0554132 -1,60 0,109 
[ln (Total Expenditures)]^2 0,0043213 0,0028316 1,53 0,127 
Husband hours worked per week -0,0000962 0,0000975 -0,99 0,324 
Wife hours worked per week 0,0000833 0,0001092 0,76 0,446 
Husband age -0,0000893 0,0001989 -0,45 0,654 
Wife age 0,0002983 0,0010235 0,29 0,771 
Wife age^2 -0,0000013 0,0000130 -0,10 0,922 
Husband education beyond high school -0,0005905 0,0016140 -0,37 0,715 
Husband master's degree and beyond -0,0007166 0,0025682 -0,28 0,780 
Wife education beyond high school 0,0007372 0,0016403 0,45 0,653 
Wife master's degree and beyond -0,0024277 0,0019506 -1,24 0,214 
Children under 2 years -0,0025353 0,0021337 -1,19 0,235 
Children 2 to 15 years -0,0009822 0,0009837 -1,00 0,318 
Houseowner 0,0002044 0,0021535 0,09 0,924 
Region Midwest -0,0001178 0,0024784 -0,05 0,962 
Region South 0,0007700 0,0022620 0,34 0,734 
Region West -0,0016724 0,0025655 -0,65 0,515 
Metropolitan residence 0,0024379 0,0022422 1,09 0,277 
Husband black 0,0065732 0,0052992 1,24 0,215 
Wife black -0,0038002 0,0057437 -0,66 0,508 
Husband Asian 0,0033479 0,0036586 0,92 0,360 
Wife Asian -0,0035122 0,0033142 -1,06 0,290 
Wife other -0,0058027 0,0056613 -1,02 0,306 
Husband other 0,0002990 0,0064183 0,05 0,963 
_cons 0,4796672 0,2669665 1,80 0,073 
  
     
   Number of obs. 812 
   R2 0.0506 
   F(25, 786) 2,23 
   Prob > F 0,0005 
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TV, Radio and Sound Equipment 
Collective model, wife deferential preferences 
 
Coefficient Robust SE t-stat p-value 
rho: (.,.5) -0,0304152 0,0077981 -3,90 0,000 
ln (Total Expenditures) -0,0933640 0,0558552 -1,67 0,095 
[ln (Total Expenditures)]^2 0,0045310 0,0028534 1,59 0,113 
Husband hours worked per week -0,0000944 0,0000959 -0,98 0,325 
Wife hours worked per week 0,0000690 0,0001050 0,66 0,511 
Husband age -0,0001288 0,0001982 -0,65 0,516 
Wife age 0,0002250 0,0010134 0,22 0,824 
Wife age^2 0,0000000 0,0000129 0,00 1,000 
Husband education beyond high school -0,0005302 0,0016155 -0,33 0,743 
Husband master's degree and beyond -0,0005659 0,0025477 -0,22 0,824 
Wife education beyond high school 0,0010220 0,0016489 0,62 0,536 
Wife master's degree and beyond -0,0025775 0,0019279 -1,34 0,182 
Children under 2 years -0,0024861 0,0021280 -1,17 0,243 
Children 2 to 15 years -0,0011093 0,0009833 -1,13 0,260 
Houseowner 0,0006290 0,0021357 0,29 0,768 
Region Midwest -0,0003925 0,0024832 -0,16 0,874 
Region South 0,0002055 0,0022386 0,09 0,927 
Region West -0,0018306 0,0025522 -0,72 0,473 
Metropolitan residence 0,0027401 0,0022060 1,24 0,215 
Husband black 0,0062902 0,0052766 1,19 0,234 
Wife black -0,0035248 0,0057314 -0,61 0,539 
Husband Asian 0,0028659 0,0036285 0,79 0,430 
Wife Asian -0,0033711 0,0032997 -1,02 0,307 
Wife other -0,0054937 0,0055279 -0,99 0,321 
Husband other -0,0005156 0,0057026 -0,09 0,928 
_cons 0,5108141 0,2697139 1,89 0,059 
  
     
   Number of obs. 812 
   R2 0.0554 
   F(25, 786) 2,47 
   Prob > F 0,0001 
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Appendix B: Mapping of UCC-Codes to 
dependent variables 
This appendix maps the UCC-codes to the aggregate goods I chose as 
dependent variables for the estimations. It also lists sub-categories that are 
computed by the BLS where relevant. 
 
CHILDREN’S CLOTHING 
 
GRLFIFPQ + GRLFIFCQ - Clothing for girls, 2 to 15 
390110 Girls’ coats, jackets, and furs 
390120 Girls’ dresses and suits 
390210 Girls’ sport coats, tailored jackets, shirts, blouses, sweaters, sweater sets, and vests 
390211 Girls’ shirts, blouses or sweaters 
390212 Girls’ shorts or shorts sets 
390223 Girls’ pants and shorts 
390230 Girls’ swimsuits, warm-up or ski suits 
390310 Girls’ undergarments and nightwear 
390321 Girls’ hosiery 
390322 Girls’ accessories 
390901 Girls’ uniforms 
390902 Girls’ other clothing, incl. costumes 
 
BOYFIFPQ BOYFIFCQ - Clothing for boys, 2 to 15 
370110 Boys’ coats, jackets, and furs 
370120 Boys’ sweaters 
370130 Boys’ shirts 
370211 Boys’ underwear 
370212 Boys’ nightwear 
370213 Boys’ hosiery 
370220 Boys’ accessories 
370311 Boys’ suits, sport coats, and vests 
370312 Boys’ pants 
370313 Boys’ Boys shorts or shorts sets 
370314 Boys’ pants and shorts 
370902 Boys’ other clothing, incl. costumes 
370903 Boys’ uniforms 
370904 Boys’ swimsuits, warm-up or ski suits 
 
CHLDRNPQ + CHLDRNCQ - Clothing for children under 2 
410110 Infants’ coats, jackets, and snowsuits 
410120 Infants’ dresses and other outerwear 
410130 Infants’ undergarments, incl. diapers 
410140 Infants’ sleeping garments 
410901 Infants’ accessories, hosiery, and footwear 
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HOUSEHOLD OPERATIONS 
 
 
DMSXCCPQ + DMSXCCCQ - Domestic services excluding child care 
340310 Housekeeping service, incl. management fees for maid service in condos 
340410 Gardening and lawn care services, incl. management fees for lawn care in coops and condos 
340420 Water softening service 
340520 Non-clothing household laundry or dry cleaning – not coin-operated 
340530 Non-clothing household laundry or dry cleaning – coin-operated 
340903 Miscellaneous home services and small repair jobs not already specified 
340914 Services for termite/pest control maintenance 
 
(340906 Care for invalids, convalescents, handicapped or elderly persons in the CU)  
(340910 Adult day care centers) 
The BLS also include the above two UCCs in the Domestic Services variable, but none of the 
households in the sample have any recorded expenditures in these categories.  
 
BBYDAYPQ + BBYDAYCQ - Babysitting and child day care  
340211 Babysitting or other child care in your own home 
340212 Babysitting or other child care in someone else’s home 
670310 Other expenses for day care centers and nursery schools, including tuition 
 
OTHHEXPQ  + OTHHEXCQ - Other household expenses 
330511 Cost of materials purchased for termite and pest control for jobs considered replacement or 
maintenance/repair 
340510 Moving, storage, and freight express 
340620 Repair of household appliances, excl. garbage disposal, range hood, and built-in dishwasher 
340630 Furniture repair, refinishing, or reupholstering 
340901 Rental or repair of equipment and other yard machinery, power and non-power tools 
340907 Rental and installation of household equipment 
340908 Rental of office equipment for non-business use 
340915 Service fee expenditures for home security systems 
690113 Repair of computers, computer systems, and related equipment for non-business use 
690114 Computer information services 
690116 Internet services away from home 
690310 Installation for computers 
990900 Rental and installation of dishwasher, disposal, and range hood 
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HOUSEHOLD EQUIPMENT 
 
TEXTILPQ Household textiles last quarter 
280110 Bathroom linens 
280120 Bedroom linens 
280130 Kitchen and dining room linens 
280210 Curtains and drapes 
280220 Slipcovers, decorative pillows, and cushions 
280230 Sewing materials for slipcovers, curtains, and other home handiwork 
280900 Other linens 
 
FURNTRPQ Furniture last quarter 
290110 Mattresses and springs 
290120 Other bedroom furniture 
290210 Sofas 
290310 Living room chairs 
290320 Living room tables 
290410 All kitchen and dining room furniture 
290420 Infants’ furniture 
290430 Patio, porch, or outdoor furniture 
290440 Modular wall units, shelves or cabinets; other living room, family or recreation room 
furniture including desks 
 
FLRCVRPQ Floor coverings last quarter 
230133 Installed and non-installed replacement wall to wall carpeting for owned homes 
230134 Installed and non-installed original wall to wall carpeting for rental homes 
320111 Carpet squares for owned and rented homes (Non-Permanent) 
320163Installed and non-installed replacement wall to wall carpeting for rental homes 
 
MAJAPPPQ Major appliances last quarter 
230117 Built-in dishwasher, garbage disposal, or range hood for jobs considered replacement or 
maintenance/repair - renter 
230118 Same as 230117 - owned home 
300112 Purchase and installation of refrigerator or home freezer – homeowner 
300211 Purchase and installation of clothes washer – renter 
300212 Purchase and installation of clothes washer – homeowner 
300221 Purchase and installation of clothes dryer – renter 
300222 Purchase and installation of clothes dryer – homeowner 
300311 Purchase and installation of cooking stove, range or oven, excl. microwave – renter 
300312 Purchase and installation of cooking stove, range or oven, excl. microwave – homeowner 
300321 Purchase and installation of microwave oven – renter 
300322 Purchase and installation of microwave oven – homeowner 
300331 Purchase and installation of portable dishwasher – renter 
300332 Purchase and installation of portable dishwasher – homeowner 
300411 Window air conditioner – renter 
300412 Window air conditioner – homeowner 
320511 Electric floor cleaning equipment 
320512 Sewing machines 
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SMLAPPPQ Small appliances, miscellaneous housewares last quarter 
320310 PLASTIC DINNERWARE 
320320 CHINA AND OTHER DINNERWARE 
320330 FLATWARE 
320340 GLASSWARE 
320350 SILVER SERVING PIECES 
320360 OTHER SERVING PIECES 
320370 NONELECTRIC COOKWARE 
320521 SMALL ELECTRIC KITCHEN APPLIANCES 
320522 PORTABLE HEATING/COOLING EQUIP 
 
MISCEQPQ Miscellaneous household equipment last quarter 
320120 Venetian blinds, window shades and other window coverings 
320130 Infants’ equipment 
320150 Barbeque grills and outdoor equipment 320220 LAMPS AND LIGHTING FIXTURES 
320232 Telephones and accessories  
320233 Clocks and other household decorative items 
320410 Lawn mowing equipment and other yard machinery 
320420 Power tools 
320901 Office furniture for home use 
320902 Non-power tools 
320903 Fresh flowers or potted plants 
320904 Closet storage items 
430130 Travel items, including luggage, and luggage carriers 
690111 Computers, computer systems, and related hardware for non-business use 
690112 Computer software and accessories for non-business use 
690115 Personal digital assistants 
690210 Telephone answering devices 
690230 Typewriters and other office machines for non-business use 
690241 Purchases and rentals of smoke alarms and detectors – renter 
690242 Same as 690241 – owned home 
690243 Same as 690241 – owned vacation home 
690244 Other household appliances – renter 
690245 Same as 690244 – homeowner 
690117 Portable memory 
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HEALTH INSURANCE 
 
580111Traditional fee for service health plan (not BC/BS) 
580112 Traditional fee for service health plan (BC/BS) 
580113 Preferred provider health plan (not BC/BS) 
580114 Preferred provider health plan (BC/BS) 
580311 Health maintenance organization (not BC/BS) 
580312 Health maintenance organization (BC/BS) 
580400 Long Term Care insurance 
580901 Medicare payment 
580903 Commercial Medicare supplement (not BC/BS) 
580904 Commercial Medicare supplement (BC/BS) 
580905 Other health insurance (not BC/BS) 
580906 Other health insurance (BC/BS) 
580907 Medicare Prescription Drug premium 
 
TV, RADIO AND SOUND EQUIPMENT 
 
270310 Cable, satellite, or community antenna service 
270311 Satellite radio service 
310140 Televisions 
310210 Video cassette recorders or video disc players 
310220 Video cassettes, tapes, and discs 
310230 Video and computer game hardware and software 
310240 Streaming or downloaded video files 
310311 Radio 
310313 Tape recorder and player 
310314 Digital audio players 
310320 Sound components, component systems, and compact disc sound systems 
310333 Accessories and other sound equipment including phonographs 
310334 Satellite dishes 
310340 Records, CDs, audio tapes 
310350 Streaming or downloaded audio files 
340610 Repair of television, radio, and sound equipment, excluding installed in vehicles 
340902 Rental of televisions 
340905 Rental of VCR, radio, and sound equipment 
610130 Musical instruments, supplies, and accessories (now includes pianos) 
620904 Rental and repair of musical instruments, supplies, and accessories (now includes pianos) 
620912 Rental of video cassettes, tapes, and discs 
620916 Rental of video or computer hardware or software 
690320 Installation for TVs 
690330 Installation for satellite TV equipment 
690340 Installation of sound systems 
690350 Installation of other video or sound systems 
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Appendix C: Table of correlations between 
the wife’s share of income and variables 
relating to time decisions and income. 
The table below provides an illustration of the possible endogeneity issues discussed in 
section 4.1.4. 
 
 
 Wife’s share of individually 
reported income, ρ 
Weekly hours worked by the wife 0.10 
Ratio of wife’s working hours to couple’s working hours  0.23 
Wife’s reported income 0.45 
Wife’s and husbands reported (individual) income -0.09 
Total expenditures -0.05 
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Appendix D: Mathematical note on Becker-
regions. 
This appendix elaborates on the exposition of Becker-regions in section 3.3.3 where it was 
claimed that transfers in the Warr-region will be zero, and that the result does not rely on 
using log-utility functions (Browning and Lechene 2001). The general utility functions from 
(3.9) were:  
( )
( ) ( )( )
,
, , ,
h h
h
w w h w
h w
U v x G
U v x G v x Gψ
=
=
 
Substitute the budget constraints for the husband and the wife into the wife’s utility function 
to get: 
 
( ) ( )( ), , ,w w h wh h h w w w h w
w h w
t h x w x
U v y g t g g v y g t g g
U v v
ψ
ψ ψ
= − + + − − +
= −
 (I) 
Furthermore, we know that for an interior solution where both contribute to the public good, 
we must have:  
 
h h
x g
w w w h w w
w x h G w G
v v
v v vψ ψ ψ
=
= +
 (II) 
Substituting from the second line in (II) into the second line in (I):   
 ( ) 0w w h w w w h w h w w w wt h x w x h G h g w G w GU v v v v v vψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ= − = − + = − <  (III) 
Hence, when both are contributing to the public good, the marginal utility of a transfer is less 
than zero – and there will be no transfer. Also, if the husband is the only person contributing 
to the public good, then there will be no transfers since he has egotistical preferences. But if 
the wife is the only person contributing to the public good, there might be transfers. Using the 
second equality in (III) and the second line in (II), we see that transfers will be positive when  
 ( ) 0w h h w wh x G w Gv v vψ ψ− − >   
The first term on the left hand side is positive or zero, since when the husband is not 
contributing, 1 1x gV V≥ . The second term is negative. So in order for transfers to be positive, the 
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wife must value his utility gain from increased consumption of the private good and reduced 
consumption of the public good more than she values her own consumption of the public 
good. 
 
 
